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C H R I S T I A  M E R C E R  A N D  R. C .  SLEIGH, J R .  
4 Metaphysics: The early period 
to the Discourse on Metaphysics 
The Discourse on Metaphysics of 1686 is generally regarded as the 
first complete presentation of Leibniz's mature metaphysics. In this 
chapter, we trace the development of that philosophy from Leibniz's 
youth, through his years in Paris, to his time in Hanover. Because the 
metaphysics of the 1680s has lately received so much attention and 
because the importance of the earlier philosophy has generally not 
been recognized, we concentrate on Leibniz's thought prior to 1680. 
In section I, we present the intellectual context in which his youthful 
metaphysics is most easily understood and summarize both his origi- 
nal metaphysical principles and his first conception of substance. We 
claim that these metaphysical principles, all of which concern sub- 
stance, form the bedrock of Leibniz's philosophy for years to come. In 
section 2, we unearth an inconsistency that Leibniz discovered be- 
tween his first account of substance and the principles, and trace the 
steps he took in revising the former. In section 3, we argue that this 
concept of substance, combined with certain theological commit- 
ments, led Leibniz to develop most of the central doctrines of his 
mature thought. For example, we claim that by April, 1676, Leibniz 
has arrived at his doctrine of preestablished harmony. In section 4, we 
discuss the relationship between his concept containment theory of 
truth, which grew out of intensive work on logic in 1679, and his 
theory of substance. We finally give a brief summary of the central 
doctrines of the metaphysics of the Discourse.I 
I T H E  O R I G I N A L  METAPHYSICS 
In 1668, Leibniz began work on an ambitious theological project 
under the encouragement of his friend and patron, Baron Johann 
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Christian von Boineburg. The motivation behind this project, enti- 
tled "Catholic Demonstrations," was to effect a reconciliation be- 
tween Roman Catholics and Protestants. Leibniz hoped to solve 
certain theological problems in a way that would satisfy members of 
both faiths and would remain consistent with the pronouncements 
of the Council of Trent. Although each of the essays in this collec- 
tion treats a traditional Christian theological question (e.g., transub- 
stantiation, incarnation), Leibniz's answers lay the foundations of 
his metaphysics. These works are especially valuable for what they 
reveal about the motivations behind Leibniz's first account of sub- 
stance. As we shall see, Leibniz soon revises his original theory, but 
the concerns and principles first articulated in these early theologi- 
cal essays continue to guide his philosophical reasoning for years to 
come. 
That Leibniz had a metaphysics at this time will come as a sur- 
prise to many. It has not been previously recognized and is discern- 
ible only if one approaches the early works with a sufficiently broad 
textual and historical perspective." 
1.1 Intellectual background and textual difficulties 
The intellectual culture of seventeenth-century Protestant Ger- 
many is enormously interesting and complicated but cannot be ade- 
quately discussed here. Two of its features are worth mentioning 
because they form the background against which Leibniz's early 
metaphysics is most easily discerned. Over the long expanse of Leib- 
niz's philosophical career, many of the details of his thought change 
and the arguments for them evolve, but he never abandons certain 
core assumptions and concerns that he acquired during his youth 
and that are firmly rooted in the intellectual climate of seventeenth- 
century Germany. 
However odd it may seem to us that Leibniz's first attempt at 
systematic metaphysics was directed towards an ecumenical goal, 
such a project was not at all unusual in the mid-seventeenth cen- 
tury. Whether motivated by political, millenarian, or other religious 
concerns, the period is full of intellectuals in search of peace among 
the faithful and of natural philosophers attempting to forge a synthe- 
sis between Christian doctrine and the new science. Throughout his 
life, many of Leibniz's most important metaphysical projects are 
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The early period to  the Discourse on Metaphysics 69 
motivated by theological questions, and he frequently criticizes 
other philosophers for not having the proper concern for such theo- 
logical matters. We will see in what follows that some of the central 
doctrines of the Discourse on Metaphysics were developed at least 
partly in an attempt to solve specific theological problems.3 
The second feature of Leibniz's intellectual culture worth discuss- 
ing here is particularly difficult to appreciate, given our twentieth- 
century sensibilities. From Renaissance humanists in Germany, Leib- 
niz acquired an intellectual goal and accompanying philosophical 
method which, however peculiar they may seem to us now, were well 
respected and widely used throughout early modern Europe.4 rohann 
C. Sturm (1635-1703)) a German philosopher with whom Leibniz 
corresponded, presents an account of both the goal and its method in 
his Eclectic Philosophy.5 According to Sturm, the goal of philosophy 
"is the Truth, as Aristotle taught" (p. 127)) and the proper way to find 
what is "most true" is to rid oneself of the dogma of any particular 
philosophical sect and to acquire knowledge of all the significant 
intellectual traditions: "all of Nature and Reason" is available to 
those "few people" who practice the proper critical eclecticism (pp. 
gff.). In order to discover the truth one must understand the philoso- 
phy of Aristotle, Plato, Gassendi, Descartes, and the "other ge- 
niuses"; once a proper understanding of the thought of such philoso- 
phers is acquired, their views can be combined into a coherent and 
true system (pp. 189f.). 
For German eclectics like Sturm, the resulting system was funda- 
mentally based in the philosophy of Aristotle. The assumption was 
that Aristotle had been systematically misinterpreted by the scho- 
lastics and that, once his philosophy was seen in light of the new 
science, it could be accurately understood. During the period, it was 
common for people to call themselves Aristotelians and yet borrow 
heavily from non-Aristotelian ideas and even from the new s ~ i e n c e . ~  
Leibniz learned this lesson well from his two most important teach- 
ers. Jacob Thomasius of Leipzig and Erhard Weigel of Jena both be- 
lieved that the thought of Aristotle had been perverted by his uncom- 
prehending Scholastic followers and, that once the philosophy of the 
ancient was disentangled from that of the incompetent Schoolmen, 
it would form the basis for the "true philosophy."7 
Unless Leibniz's first metaphysical reflections and his subsequent 
philosophical development are seen against the background of this 
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70 THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LEIBNIZ 
eclectic Aristotelianism, they are nearly impossible to discern. 
Therefore, in studying Leibniz's texts it is important to keep in mind 
that by the time he had finished his formal studies, he had acquired a 
goal, a method, and a set of assumptions that would persist for years 
to come. The goal was to uncover the truth that was presumed to lie 
hidden beneath the various conflicting philosophical schools; the 
method was to study carefully all the prominent philosophical sects 
and, in Sturm's words, not "to cut ourselves off from any source of 
knowledge" (p. 20); the assumptions were that the philosophy of 
Aristotle does not conflict with the new science and could be made 
to cohere with other philosophical traditions (e.g., Platonism); the 
result was a system firmly based in the philosophy of Aristotle, 
somewhat imaginatively interpreted.8 It should not be surprising 
therefore that throughout his life Leibniz studies a wide range of 
authors, that he is inclined to force comparisons between his own 
views and those of other thinkers, and that he often uses terms and 
philosophical jargon from an odd collection of sources to express his 
own ideas (see, e.g., A VI.ii 27gf.: W gof.; A V1.i 5 16: L 117f.; G IV 
479f.: AG 140: G IV 451ff.: AG 58). 
In order to discover Leibniz's earliest metaphysical ideas it is not 
only important to understand something about the complications 
of his intellectual culture, it is also necessary to appreciate the 
difficulty posed by his philosophical corpus. Although this ener- 
getic German wrote thousands of pages of notes and hundreds of 
letters, he published very little, and there is no single systematic 
text in which he explicates his philosophy. One has to piece to- 
gether Leibniz's metaphysics from his abundant letters and short, 
mostly unedited essays. This by itself would not be so difficult if it 
were not for the fact that Leibniz is often both imprecise and in- 
complete in the articulation of his ideas. His notes - replete with 
cross-outs, arrows, and reformulations - reveal an impatient intel- 
lect hurrying to express its ideas as quickly as possible. As Leibniz 
himself wrote about his papers in 1676: "instead of treasure. . . , 
you will only find ashes; instead of elaborate works, a few sheets of 
paper and some poorly expressed vestiges of hasty reflections, 
which were only saved for the sake of my memory" (A VI.iii 533). 
One might expect more from the letters that he sent to the great 
philosophers of Europe, often with the expressed intention of reveal- 
ing his ideas. But there is a problem even here: Leibniz neither 
Downloaded from Cambridge Companions Onl e by IP 128.59.152.64 on Tu  Apr 09 20:42:24 WEST 2013.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521365880.004
Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2013
Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006
The early period to  the Discourse on Metaphysics 71 
states his most fundamental assumptions nor explains how he ar- 
rived at his conclusions. In an uncharacteristically frank moment 
of 1676 Leibniz writes: 
A metaphysics should be written with accurate definitions and demonstra- 
tions, but nothing should be demonstrated in it apart from that which does 
not clash too much with received opinions. For in that way this metaphys- 
ics can be accepted; and once it has been approved then, if people examine i t  
more deeply later, they themselves will draw the necessary consequences. 
Besides this, one can, as a separate undertaking, show these people later the 
way of reasoning about these things. In this metaphysics, it will be useful 
for there to be added here and there the authoritative utterances of great 
men, who have reasoned in a similar way; especially when these utterances 
contain something that seems to have some possible relevance to the illus- 
tration of a view. (A VI.iii 5 73f.: Pk 95; our emphasis) 
There is one especially important lesson to be learned here: as stu- 
dents of Leibniz, we must not be satisfied with the definitions and 
demonstrations that he offers, nor should we accept at face value his 
proclamations about other philosophers. Rather, we must be willing 
to dig beneath these definitions and comments in an attempt to 
discover the more fundamental assumptions beneath. Only when 
we have unearthed these assumptions will we have arrived at his 
real "way of reasoning about these things." 
Given the scant help Leibniz gives his reader about his underlying 
concerns and deep motivations, it is no wonder that it has been so 
difficult to make out his most fundamental views. It is in an attempt 
to discover these views that we turn to Leibniz's early metaphysics 
where his most basic assumptions are closest to the surface and 
easiest to discern. 
1.2 The original metaphysical principles 
When Leibniz begins work on the theological project in 1668, he is 
both a mechanist and an Aristotelian and maintains that the phi- 
losophy of Aristotle "can be conformed easily" to that of the 
mechanists (A 1I.i 10). He is a mechanist in the sense that he 
accepts mechanical explanations in physics: "I maintain the rule 
which is common to all these modems, [namely that] nothing 
ought to be explained in bodies except through magnitude, figure, 
and motion" (A 1I.i IS: L*94; cf. A V1.i 490: L I I O ) . ~  He is an 
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Aristotelian in his basic metaphysical commitments, especially his 
robust sense of the self-sufficiency of individual corporeal sub- 
stances. That is, Leibniz sides with "the Moderns" in that he wants 
to explain corporeal properties in terms of matter in motion, but he 
rejects what he considers to be the metaphysical foundations of 
that physics. In his opinion, mechanists like Hobbes, Gassendi, and 
Descartes were mistaken in assuming that they could ground their 
physics in a notion of body that included only the material and 
excluded the immaterial. Leibniz's original metaphysics is an at- 
tempt to replace that wholly material (and hence "atheistic") foun- 
dation with his own Aristotelian conception that combines the 
corporeal with the incorporeal. By forging a synthesis of Aristote- 
lian metaphysics and mechanical physics, he hopes to show "that 
the very views which the moderns are putting forth so pompously 
flow from Aristotelian principles" (A 1I.i I 6: L* 95).'0 
Both Leibniz's argument against the mechanical concept of corpo- 
real substance and his reasons for replacing it with his own concep- 
tion are easily lost in the obscurity and complications of the texts. 
They become apparent only when seen against the background of his 
basic metaphysical assumptions. Leibniz is rarely explicit about 
these assumptions, but they are discernible as the implicit premises 
and unstated assumptions of his arguments in the texts of 1668-69. 
Each exposes a slightly different aspect of the robust self-sufficiency 
that Leibniz requires of substances; together they form the bedrock 
of his metaphysical thinking. They may be summarized as follows. 
The Principle of Self-sufficiency (PS): a being S is self-sufficient if 
and only if the complete reason for its properties can be discovered 
in the nature of s.11 
The Principle of Substantial Self-sufficiency (PSS): a being S is a 
substance if and only if S is self-sufficient. I2 
The Principle of Causal Self-sufficiency (PCS): for any being S, 
strictly speaking, S can be said to have a property p and p can be said 
to exist in S just in case the complete reason for p can be found in the 
nature of S. '3 
The Principle of Substantial Activity (PSA): a being S is a sub- 
stance if and only if it subsists per se and S subsists per se if and only 
if it has a principle of activity within its own nature.14 
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): for everything there is 
there is a complete reason.15 A complete reason for some state of 
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The early period to the Discourse on Metaphysics 7 3  
affairs S ( I )  constitutes the necessary and sufficient condition for S; 
(2)  is perspicuous in that, in those cases where one can understand it, 
one sees exactly why S as opposed to some other state of affairs came 
about; ( 3 )  is such that in those cases when a full account of it can be 
given, that account constitutes a complete explanation of S; and (4) 
the reason itself does not require a reason of the same type.16 This 
notion of complete reason along with the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason implies two other assumptions. 
The Logical Assumption: for any state of affairs S, the logically 
necessary and sufficient conditions of S exist and in theory can be 
articulated; the Intelligibility Assumption: those conditions are in 
theory intelligible. 
These original metaphysical principles and assumptions imply a 
good deal about both the universe and its maker. They yield a world 
of active, self-sufficient substances whose natures constitute the 
cause and explanation of their properties. Since all the events of the 
natural world are ultimately reducible to these substantial natures, 
the world is rendered both explicable and intelligible. It is signifi- 
cant that Leibniz does not think it is necessary to argue for these 
claims: the intelligibility of the world seems to follow from his 
belief in the wisdom and rationality of God; the self-sufficiency of 
essentially active substances from his acceptance of the philosophy 
of Aristotle, as he interpreted it. 
The importance that these metaphysical commitments have for 
the development of Leibniz's thought cannot be overemphasized: 
they guide his metaphysical reasoning for years to come. The precise 
role they play in the development of his orignal conception of sub- 
stance is perhaps most apparent in the criticisms Leibniz offers of 
the standard metaphysical foundations of mechanism. 
1.3 The original concept of substance 
Leibniz and the Modems agree that all the properties of bodies are 
reducible to the motion of matter and that motion itself cannot be 
derived from corporeal nature alone. That is, however the standard 
mechanist defined body (e.g., as extended stuff or as extended, im- 
penetrable stuff), they agreed with Leibniz that motion could not be 
derived from it. Because corporeal nature needed an outside source 
of motion, each philosopher had some way of bringing God, as a 
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source of motion, to body. For example, Descartes maintains that 
God adds motion to body by continual creation, while Gassendi 
thinks that God infuses motion into atoms at their creation.17 
But this is where the agreement between Leibniz and the Moderns 
ends. The latter maintained that God was in some sense the cause of 
the motion in bodies and yet they were perfectly happy to make 
motion a fundamental property of body. For instance, Descartes 
maintains that motion is a mode of extension, even though it has to 
be added to extension by God. The important point here is that, for 
the standard mechanist, regardless of how motion comes into the 
picture, two things were taken to be true about it: ( I )  it is not reduc- 
ible to or caused by the nature or essence of body and yet (2) it is a 
fundamental feature of body. Leibniz finds this position unaccept- 
able and offers ( I )  as a reason for denying (2). For Leibniz, the Mod- 
erns made two crucial mistakes, one made evident by the PCS, the 
other by the PSS. First, they attributed motion to body as a funda- 
mental property or mode despite the fact that the cause of motion 
did not reside in the nature of body. According to Leibniz and the 
PCS, if the cause of motion is not in corporeal nature, then strictly 
speaking motion cannot be said to belong to that nature (see, for 
instance, A 11.1 23f, L I O I ~ ) .  Second, they intended to construct a 
substance out of corporeal nature alone despite the fact that it is was 
not "self-sufficient" and could "not subsist without an incorporeal 
principle." According to Leibniz and the PSS, any substance worth 
the name ought to be self-sufficient at least with regard to its essen- 
tial properties (A V1.i 490: L 110). In other words, for Leibniz, the 
standard mechanical conception of corporeal substance was unac- 
ceptably insubstantial. 
Leibniz's original notion of substance grew out of his attempt to 
make corporeal substance properly substantial while retaining me- 
chanical physics. His commitment to the metaphysical principles 
listed above required that such a substance be both causally and 
substantially self-sufficient in the appropriate way; his commitment 
to mechanical physics demanded it be constituted of extended stuff 
in motion; his commitment to the philosophy of Aristotle implied 
that the substance would have both a passive and active principle. 
In constructing the proper passive principle, Leibniz distinguished 
between matter and body: the former is nothing other than impene- 
trability and extension, matter without mind, inert stuff without a 
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principle of activity, and hence without motion; the latter is a combi- 
nation of matter and a principle of activity that can cause motion.18 
As Leibniz explains: "It must be demonstrated against Descartes 
that space and extension are really different from body because other- 
wise motion would not be a real thing [in body]" (A V1.i 5 10). Matter 
is basically inert stuff and does not have motion while body is consti- 
tuted of matter in motion.19 
Mind functions as the active principle and plays the role of the 
Aristotelian substantial form. According to Leibniz, because only 
something incorporeal can act as a source of activity, it follows from 
the PSA that a substance is that which has an incorporeal principle. 
Because of the fundamental connection between substance and activ- 
ity, a body will be a substance if and only if it is in union with 
something incorporeal that can function as its principle of activity. 
Leibniz writes: "Something when taken together with concurring 
mind is substance," otherwise it is not. A mind makes the body 
substantial by constituting its principle of activity: "the substance 
of the body is union with sustaining mind" (A V1.i 508-9: L 115- 
16).=0 There are two sorts of minds and hence two sorts of sub- 
stances. Leibniz writes: "the substance of the human body is union 
with human mind, and the substance of bodies which lack reason 
[i.e., nonhuman substances] is union with the universal mind, or 
God" (A V1.i 509: L 116). For both human and nonhuman sub- 
stances, mind is the active principle, that which informs matter 
with motion and thereby makes it into a corporeal substance. Hu- 
man substances have their own minds and hence their own source of 
activity. Nonhuman substances have God, the "universal mind," as 
their active, determining principle. In his role as "primary form" 
(e.g., A 1I.i zo: L 99), God individuates matter and thereby produces 
an individual substance, or what Leibniz sometimes describes as "an 
organized arrangement of parts" of matter (A 1I.i 16f.: L 96)." Accord- 
ing to Leibniz, in devising his conception of substance, he has fol- 
lowed Aristotle: the individual corporeal substance is composed of 
indeterminate matter and a determining form; the substantial na- 
ture, here a composite of matter in motion, acts as the cause and 
explanation of its properties (A 11.1 11; A 11.1 zrf.: L 100). 
We noted above that, when Leibniz began work on the theological 
project in 1668, he was both a mechanist and an Aristotelian and 
maintained that the philosophy of Aristotle "can be conformed eas- 
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ily" to that of the mechanists (A 1I.i 10). We have just described the 
motivation behind his original notion of substance: he found what 
he considered to be serious flaws in the foundations of mechanical 
physics and attempted to construct his own, more secure Aristote- 
lian foundation."" There are two points to make about the results of 
this, Leibniz's first attempt at original metaphysics. First, Leibniz 
does forge a synthesis of mechanical and Aristotelian elements. By 
demoting the mechanical conception of body to prime matter and 
hence to a mere constituent of corporeal substance and by defining 
corporeal substance as the union of matter and mind, Leibniz makes 
his conception more appropriately self-sufficient and more consis- 
tent with Aristotelian metaphysics. Matter and mind combine as 
passive and active elements to form a union that constitutes the 
cause and explanation for the properties of substances and hence for 
everything else there is. But Leibniz's original notion of corporeal 
substance is also consistent with mechanical physics: by making 
substance a union of mind and matter, he has all the necessary 
ingredients for a proper mechanical physics. As Leibniz happily pro- 
claims in 1669, "the explanation of all qualities must be found in 
magnitude, figure, motion, etc." (A 1I.i 23f.: L 102). 
The second point to emphasize about Leibniz's original account of 
substance is that it is very much a tentative solution to the difficult 
philosophical and theological issues with which he was grappling in 
1668-69. By April, 1669, Leibniz has decided both that the Modems 
were seriously mistaken in their materialist conception of corporeal 
substance and that the only way to correct their mistake and to 
solve certain difficult theological problems (e.g., transubstantiation) 
was to put something incorporeal into substance.23 But he was unde- 
cided about the details of his solution. Most importantly, he was 
unclear about how to conceive the relations between God and mat- 
ter. His second conception of substance evolved out of an attempt to 
solve this problem. 
2 THE O R I G I N S  OF THE M A T U R E  T H E O R Y  OF 
S U B S T A N C E ,  I 669- 1672 
Leibniz was proud of his original account of substance. In his writ- 
ings of 1668-69 he frequently emphasizes the several advantages 
that he thinks it has both in solving theological problems (e.g., A 1I.i 
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I I, 24; A V1.i 508, 492, 494) and in revealing the true sophistication 
of the philosophy of Aristotle (e.g., A 1I.i IS, 18; A V1.i 510). He 
probably would have maintained this conception if not for a problem 
he found lurking beneath the surface, one that he considered signifi- 
cant enough to require a dramatic shift in his thinking. The problem 
is due to the fact that, while each nonhuman corporeal substance 
has a nature (i.e., an organized arrangement of parts of matter) in 
terms of which its properties can be explained, that nature is itself 
caused by a substance that stands wholly outside of it. What Leibniz 
came to consider problematic is that, although corporeal properties 
follow from the combination of matter and motion, motion is itself 
caused by something substantially distinct from that nature. It fol- 
lows from the PCS and the fact that God is the cause of motion in 
body that, strictly speaking, the motion neither belongs to the body 
nor really exists in it. And, if motion is not really in the body, it 
becomes unclear how the nature of body is supposed to be consti- 
tuted of matter in motion. Since God causes the nature (by moving 
the matter), it follows from the PCS that the motion does not really 
belong to the nature and hence that the nature does not strictly 
speaking belong to the body. 
Nor is it clear how the properties of a body that are supposed to be 
caused by this nature really belong to it. For example, according to 
the mechanical physics to which Leibniz is committed, the shape of 
a body is reducible to and explainable in terms of the arrangement of 
the parts of the body. But, since the cause of motion is God, it is not 
clear in what sense the shape belongs to the body. Because God 
causes the shape by moving the matter, it would seem to follow 
from the PCS that the shape belongs as much to God as to the body. 
In other words, it is not clear whether the shape of the shoe is 
strictly in God or in the object. 
Because Leibniz was concerned to formulate an account of non- 
human substance that would be both substantially and causally 
self-sufficient, the fact that his original conception turns out not to 
be self-sufficient in just these ways constitutes a serious flaw. 
Leibniz's second conception of substance grew out of his attempt 
to solve exactly this problem. Between the spring of 1669 and the 
winter of 1670, he realized that the only justifiable way to attribute 
corporeal properties to individual bodies, given his PCS, and to 
make nonhuman corporeal substances properly self-sufficient, given 
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his PSS, was to give each body its own incorporeal principle, one 
that could be part of corporeal nature in the way God was not. 
Leibniz makes the point succinctly in the mid-1670s when he ex- 
plains that "in order to complete the concept of Body. . . [a princi- 
ple of] action. . . has to be added to the concept of extension" (A 
VI.iii 158: W 64; our emphasis). 
In 1669, Leibniz had his work cut out for him. First, he had to 
decide upon an incorporeal principle to put into body so that its 
nature would be the cause of its own motion and hence of its proper- 
ties. Second, Leibniz had to find a way to make this incorporeal 
principle part of the nature of the substance: otherwise, he would 
not have escaped the problem facing his first conception. Following 
the PSS, if the corporeal and incorporeal principles were not unified 
into a single nature, the problem with the original account would 
remain, i.e., the motion would belong only to the incorporeal princi- 
ple that directly caused it and not to the substance as a whole. To 
avoid this problem, the corporeal and incorporeal elements in sub- 
stance had to form one nature so that the motion strictly speaking 
could be attributed to the substance and not just to the incorporeal 
cause of motion within the substance. 
There is straightforward evidence that Leibniz's development 
took exactly these steps, and for precisely these reasons, i.e., that 
once he discovered the problem with his original concept of sub- 
stance, he decided to solve it by giving each body its own incorporeal 
principle and then worked out the details of how to form a substan- 
tial union out of two things, each with its own nature.I4 The steps 
that Leibniz took in devising his full solution are as follows. 
In April, 1669, Leibniz wrote a letter to his revered teacher, Jacob 
Thomasius, presenting for the first time in detail his original concep- 
tion of substance. In early 1670, Leibniz published an edition of a 
text by the Renaissance humanist, Marius Nizolius. Besides writing 
a preface to the text, Leibniz attached to it a slightly altered version 
of his letter to Thomasius. Although the actual additions and dele- 
tions in the second, published version of the letter are few, they 
represent a fundamental shift in Leibniz's views about substance: 
Leibniz adds an incorporeal principle, namely thought (cogitatio), to 
extension as an element in corporeal substance and deletes the refer- 
ence to God as the cause of the motion in bodies." That is, within 
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months of composing his original letter to Thomasius, Leibniz had 
recognized not only the problem with his first account of substance 
but also what was required to solve it. 
The changes Leibniz makes in the letter do not constitute any 
thing like a fully worked out solution to the problem, but they do 
reveal both Leibniz's recognition of the problem and the form his 
solution would take. Leibniz is searching for some kind of incorpo- 
real principle that can take the place of God as the cause of motion. 
It is not surprising then that within weeks of revising his letter to 
Thomasius, Leibniz is hard at work constructing a new conception 
of substance. The first explicit revision of Leibniz's original concep- 
tion of substance occurs in a theological essay entitled On the Incar- 
nation of God or Hypostatic Union. In this paper, Leibniz faces the 
problem of hypostatic union, here understood to be the problem of 
how there can be a union of the divine and human natures of Christ. 
Given Leibniz's philosophical concerns at the time, the theological 
problem of hypostatic union seems an especially appropriate context 
for a discussion of how an immaterial and a material principle (each 
with its own nature) are to be related so as to form one substance. 
Although Leibniz's discussion in this unfinished essay is enor- 
mously complicated, the points relevant to the present discussion 
may be summarized as follows. Leibniz describes an hypostatic 
union between two things, A and B, in the following way: "If A is 
[that which does] the unifying and B is that which is said to be 
unified, then, in the first place, A is a thing subsisting per se; in the 
second, A acts through B . . . ; and thus, A acts immediately in B or 
[seu] not through another" (A V1.i 534). Here we find the three cru- 
cial features of an hypostatic union: the union is made out of two 
elements, one active, one passive; the active element subsists per se, 
but can only act through the other; the passive element need not 
subsist per se, but is the means by which the active element acts. 
Moreover, according to Leibniz, although God does not need a pas- 
sive element through which to act, created mind does. This means 
that in order for there to be any activity in the created world, hy- 
postatical unions are required. Further, it is not enough that the 
active element acts some of the time, it must act constantly on the 
passive element. The idea seems to be that when the acting stops, so 
does the union. Thus, according to Leibniz, A and B are hy- 
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postatically unified if and only if the active element acts constantly 
on the passive element and the latter is its "immediate instrument" 
of acting. 
Leibniz's pronouncements here represent a significant step to- 
wards solving the problem with his original account of substance 
and constitute the foundations of a new conception. By focusing on 
the necessary conditions for an hypostatic union, the essay squarely 
faces the problem with the first account. According to the PCS, a 
property p will belong to an object b if and only if the full account of 
p is found in the nature of b. The crucial flaw with the original view 
was that the cause of the motion of body qua substance (namely, 
divine mind) stood outside it and, hence, remained wholly distinct 
from the nature of the corporeal substance. The key to Leibniz's new 
position is that he inserts created mind between God and body qua 
matter and withdraws the claim that God causes the motion in the 
corporeal substance. Instead, God creates mind so that it may act as 
"God's instrument." By such means, created mind becomes the prin- 
ciple of activity in the body qua substance; it thereby constitutes, 
along with its matter, the nature of the substance and the cause and 
explanation of its properties. 
Nor is it problematic that mind, the incorporeal element in the 
substance, is the efficient cause of the activity in the substance. 
While the mind is the source of activity, the motion or action must 
occur through matter. By combining mind and body qua matter in 
the way he does, Leibniz has cleverly managed to create a single unit 
out of corporeal and incorporeal elements. His strategy is fairly sim- 
ple: a real substantial union between elements of two different na- 
tures (one active, one passive) depends on the constant activity of 
the active principle on the passive principle because the constancy 
of the union of the two depends on the constancy of the connection 
between them. Since the two elements will cease to be a union 
when they cease to be connected, and since constant activity assures 
constant connection, Leibniz's account of substantial union requires 
constant activity. In other words, the hypostatic union of incorpo- 
real and corporeal natures crucially depends upon two features of the 
principle of activity: first, that it constantly acts and, second, that it 
cannot act except through the matter in which it is rooted. 
A comparison to organic unities may be helpful at this point. If 
one understands an organic unity to be composed of a mind and 
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some portion of matter, then it is easy to understand why the unity 
requires the constant activity of the one on the other. With any 
organic unity, however simple or complex, its survival depends on 
the maintenance of its organization: if the mind or organizing princi- 
ple in either an amoeba or rhododendron desists in acting, then the 
organization ceases and the union dissolves; there is no longer an 
organized arrangement of matter, but a heap of decaying flesh. On 
this model the active element or mind cannot act outside itself 
except through the passive element, because in order to act exter- 
nally it has to do so through the matter that it organizes. 
Despite the fact that On the Incarnation of God presents the funda- 
mental structure of Leibniz's second account of substance, it leaves 
crucial questions unanswered. Most of these cluster around the issue 
of the nature of mind and its relation to body. It is not surprising, there- 
fore, that upon completing this essay, Leibniz turned his attention to 
topics concerning mind. According to his own account, it was during 
the winter of 1669-70, that Leibniz was able "to penetrate" into the 
"deepest nature of mind" (A 1I.i 65) and to grasp that the motion of 
bodies cannot be explained "without invoking incorporeal beings" (A 
1I.i 64-65). The results of this study were significant: not only did 
Leibniz produce the most important publication of his early years, he 
summarized his new views in a series of letters that he sent to some of 
the most prominent philosophers of Europe. These writings contain 
the original formulations of what would become Leibniz's mature 
metaphysics. Although there is not space heie to go into their details, 
the most significant metaphysical conclusions of these texts follow. 
Leibniz published two major works in I 67 I : the New Physical Hy- 
pothesis, which he dedicated to the Royal Society of London and the 
Theory of Abstract Motion, which he dedicated to the Royal Acad- 
emy of Paris. It is in the latter that he presents his new idea: "I 
demonstrated that the true locus of mind is a certain point or center" 
that is unextended and indivisible (A 1I.i 173: L 149) and thereby 
showed that "mind itself actually exists in a point as opposed to body 
[which] occupies space" (A 11.1 108). By conceiving of a point as that 
which is unextended and indivisible, Leibniz gave himself the concep- 
tual means to distinguish neatly between the "place" of mind and 
that of body and hence a way of putting mind into body.26 
The second crucial discovery during this period concerns the pre- 
cise relation between the mind and the substance of which it is part. 
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Leibniz is especially explicit about this in a letter to Duke Johann 
Friedrich of May 1671. He asserts that "there is a kernel of [every] 
substance" that can either "spread throughout" the body or "draw 
itself into an invisible center" and that is like the source and "fount 
of the substance." According to Leibniz the mind or kernel of every 
corporeal substance causes and maintains its organization, which 
can be more or less expansive. The mind does not literally spread 
throughout the body (for then it would exist in space), but the organi- 
zation that it causes does. That is, the incorporeal principle causes 
and maintains an organization of matter that can be more or less 
"spread out." Making explicit use of an organic model, Leibniz asks 
us to conceive the relation between substance and mind as that 
between an organism and its organizing principle: just as it is the 
organizing principle that causes the organism to grow from an acorn 
to a tree and then, say, to survive the removal of several limbs, it is 
the mind that produces and sustains the organized arrangement of 
matter in every body (A 1I.i 108f.).=7 
Along with his letter to the Duke, Leibniz enclosed an essay on a 
"most difficult" theological problem, the resurrection of the body. 
Drawing upon the same organic model, Leibniz offers a neat solution 
to the problem. He explains that the soul resides in "a certain center" 
of a corporeal substance which is the "fountain of life" of the sub- 
stance and that, even in fire or other drastic physical changes, this 
center survives in the ashes or some small part of the original body. 
Resurrection occurs when "the flower of the substance of the same 
body [that died], through excretions and emissions, transforms itself 
into something new." Moreover, according to Leibniz, this "flower of 
substance" explains "the generation of plants from seeds," the devel- 
opment of "the seed in the uterus," and even "the essences of chemi- 
cals" (A 1I.i 116). Thus, human beings, animals, plants, and even 
chemical elements are all substances in the sense that they are consti- 
tuted of mind and matter, where the former constantly acts on the 
latter and in doing so produces a single unified thing. This unity of 
mind and matter can expand (as when a plant grows from a seed) or 
recede (as when a tree burns away to ash), but through all such 
changes the mind and some bit of matter persist. 
An obvious question arises at this point: how do the minds in 
chemical elements and plants differ from those in human beings? 
Leibniz was enormously proud of the fact that in studying "the 
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innermost nature of mind" he had developed an answer to just this 
question. He writes: "I demonstrated that the true locus of mind is a 
certain point or center, and from this I deduced some remarkable 
conclusions about. . . the true innermost difference between mo- 
tion and thought" (A 11.1 173: L 149). The key to understanding the 
difference is to appreciate the importance of the fact that, although 
"mind in its very nature acts" (A 11.1 162) and "the actions of mind 
consist in conatuses" which are infinitesimal motions "in a point" 
(A 1I.i 108)~ only the actions of "true minds" persist and thereby 
produce "a harmony of conatuses." It is the persistence of the ac- 
tions of true minds that allows them "to think, to compare diverse 
things, to perceive" (A 1I.i I 13). The minds in bodies do not persist; 
during the period Leibniz sometimes describes them as momentary 
(e.g., A 11.1 102; A VI.ii 266: L 141). 
In the development of his second account of substance, Leibniz 
did not focus exclusively on the topic of mind. He also deliberated 
upon the nature of matter, the other constituent in corporeal sub- 
stance. Sometime in 1670171 Leibniz wrote an important fragment 
"On Prime Matter" in which he reveals the full force of his eclecti- 
cism. He argues that "the prime matter of Aristotle is the same as 
the subtle matter of Descartes: each is infinitely divisible, each 
lacks form and motion per se, each receives form through motion, 
and each receives motion from mind." Moreover, Leibniz praises 
those Scholastics who believed that "prime matter has [its] exis- 
tence from form," which he understands to mean that without mo- 
tion there is no variety and without variety "matter is nothing." In 
other words, prime matter becomes some thing when mind orga- 
nizes it into a body. What he considers one of his contributions to 
these views is that "matter is actually divided into infinite parts" so 
that "there are infinite creatures in any given body" (A VI.ii 279f: 
W* gof). 
With this said, the materials are in place to explicate Leibniz's 
second theory of substance. Interestingly enough, its structure is 
fundamentally the same as the first conception. Matter plays the 
role of Aristotelian prime matter, i.e., it is indeterminate and must 
be made some thing through activity: "particulars or bodies arise" 
only when matter is activated by mind (A VI.ii 280: W 91). The 
principle of activity is something incorporeal that plays the role of 
the Aristotelian substantial form, the determining principle, that 
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which makes the thing what it is. When the incorporeal principle 
individuates matter, the result is an individual corporeal substance. 
And once again the resulting physics is fundamentally mechanical 
in that all corporeal properties are reducible to and explainable in 
terms of the movements of the parts of body. 
The crucial difference between the two theories is that in the 
second each substance has its own principle of activity or substan- 
tial form that is so related to the corporeal principle as to form a 
single nature with it. Although mind exists in a point, it constantly 
acts through the matter to which it is attached and, as Leibniz 
writes, it can "act upon" a larger or smaller extent of matter. It is 
important to emphasize the fact that every activity is the result of 
mind's acting through matter: the mind does the moving, but the 
matter is what is moved. Thus, mind and matter are constitutive 
parts of any activity. Since the mind and the matter are constantly 
joined in the activity of the one on the other, the substance is an 
hypostatic union of mind and matter; each substance is constituted 
by mind and matter in constant relation. By so combining mind and 
matter to form an hypostatic union, Leibniz renders substance self- 
sufficient in a way consistent with the PSS and PCS. He thereby 
solves the problem with his original theory and lays the groundwork 
for his mature metaphysics. 
3 T H E  E V O L U T I O N  OF T H E  MATURE PHILOSOPHY,  
1672-1676 
For decades, core features of the philosophy of the Discourse on 
Metaphysics have baffled scholars. Despite extensive analysis and 
study, its deep motivations and the precise relations among some of 
its central doctrines have remained largely m y s t e r i ~ u s . ~ ~  We will 
argue in this section that most of the fundamental tenets of Leib- 
niz's mature thought are already in place in 1676 and that they grew 
naturally out of Leibniz's early metaphysics. 
During the four years Leibniz spent in Paris (1672-76), his intellec- 
tual energies were focused primarily on mathematical and technical 
problems. The results include the construction of a calculating ma- 
chine that was successfully demonstrated in early 1675 and the in- 
vention of the calculus in the autumn of that year. But he did not 
wholly neglect the metaphysical ideas that he worked so hard to 
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develop during the period of 1669-71. In Paris, he found time to 
enlarge upon key elements of the earlier metaphysical system."9 At 
the most general level, his metaphysical investigations concern four 
areas of study: God as the cause of the universe (sec. 3.1) and created 
minds as the source of the activity (3.2), plenitude (3.3), and har- 
mony (3.4) in that world.30 
3 .  I God and the importance of being harmonious 
In March, 1673 Leibniz wrote a letter to Duke Johann Friedrich in 
which he describes his intellectual activities during his first year in 
Paris: "I have made important demonstrations in the difficult areas 
of religion and the true philosophy," and also contributions con- 
cerning "the inner nature of things" (A 11.1 232). That God stands at 
the center of this "true philosophy" and that the evolution in Leib- 
nizls thinking about mind and matter during the period is encour- 
aged by his reflections on the nature of God is clear from his notes. 
Leibniz arrived in Paris with the basic outline of his theory of 
substance; the next step in his metaphysical investigations was to 
examine the precise relationship between such creatures and their 
creator. 
Leibniz's analysis of this relationship is best seen in the context of 
the PSR and its notion of a complete reason. The PSR implies that 
God as the cause of the world is its sufficient reason. As Leibniz 
defined it just before his departure for Paris, "a sufficient reason is 
that which having been given the thing is" (A VI.ii 483). The notion 
of complete reason demands an intimate and intelligible relation 
between a cause and its effect so that an examination of the divine 
sufficient reason would in theory render the effect intelligible. When 
Leibniz arrived in Paris he assumed that the world would have fea- 
tures that reflect or express this divine cause. Before moving ahead 
in his metaphysical enquiries, it was necessary to identify the rele- 
vant features of the world as a product of God. Only after a careful 
inventory of those features had been made could Leibniz proceed to 
construct the "true philosophy." 
In his: Philosoph erg Confession of 1672, Leibniz identifies har- 
mony as the dominant feature of the world that God had sufficient 
reason to create. He writes: "God is the ultimate reason of things, 
i.e., the sufficient reason of the universe" which itself is "most 
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rational" and "most supreme in beauty and universal harmony" (A 
VI.iii 126). Harmony is the most supreme unity within the greatest 
variety and is that feature of the world that follows from God's 
nature (A VI.iii rzzf). In an important essay of 1676, entitled "On the 
Secrets of the Sublime" he proclaims: "After due consideration I 
take as a principle the harmony of things: that is, that the greatest 
amount of essence that can exist does exist" (A VI.iii 472: Pk 21). In 
order to attribute as much goodness as possible to the universe, 
Leibniz assumes that essences are good and then reasons that the 
more (compatible) essences in the world the better. It is important 
that Leibniz is not just after the greatest possible number of es- 
sences, he wants to make every positive aspect of the world as full as 
possible. He states: "It follows from this principle that there is no 
vacuum among forms; also that there is no vacuum in place and 
time. . . . From which it follows that there is no assignable time in 
which something did not exist, nor is there a place which is not full" 
(A VI.iii 473: Pk 23). Although he is uncertain about the exact conse- 
quences of this "plenitude of the world," he thinks that "it is true 
that any part of matter, however small, contains an infinity of crea- 
tures, i.e., is a world" (A VI.iii 474: Pk 25). It becomes clear in the 
course of the essay that this commitment to plenitude is only one 
part of the principle of harmony and that proper maximization will 
occur only within the context of a divinely arranged elegant simplic- 
ity. God is the kind of "intelligent substance" and "perfect mind" 
who finds what is "most harmonious" to be "most pleasing" and 
who "arranged all things from the beginning" such that "all things 
are in general good" (A VI.iii 474ff.: Pk' 25ff.) .  The suggestion is that 
God's creation combines the greatest possible elegance with the 
greatest possible variety. Leibniz emphasizes the harmonious sim- 
plicity of the universe in an essay written a few months later: "Har- 
mony is just this: a certain simplicity in multiplicity. Beauty and 
pleasure also consist in this. So for things to exist is the same as for 
them to be understood by God to be the best, i.e., the most harmo- 
nious" (A VI.iii 588: Pk I 13). 
From these and related texts it is clear that by 1676 Leibniz has 
committed himself to a principle of harmony according to which the 
world is as full as possible while also being rational, elegant, and good. 
In such a way the universe reflects the "divine wisdom" of its cause. 
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3.2 Mind and activity 
While Leibniz was deciding upon harmonious plenitude as the 
dominant feature of God's creation, he was also concerned with 
developing his theory of substance along consistent lines. It was 
surely of immediate importance to explain how the principles of 
activity in substances could accommodate such harmony. In sec- 
tion 2, we argued that the success of Leibniz's second account of 
substance depended on two specific innovations: first, that the prin- 
ciple of activity or mind in substance could create with its matter, 
by the constant activity of the one on the other, a single substantial 
nature; second, that the organization created by mind acting on 
matter could be more or less expansive. In 1672-76, Leibniz devel- 
ops these points in ways consonant with harmony. 
During the period, Leibniz emphasizes the connection (explicit in 
the PSA) between activity and substantiality: he emphasizes the fact 
that a substance is "a thing that acts" and acknowledges that minds 
insofar as they act are themselves "incorporeal substances" (e.g., A 
VI.iii 78ff.). But he is also explicit about the fact that there are no 
disembodied or spiritual substances. According to Leibniz, "God 
alone" is a substance "separate from matter" (A VI.iii 395: Pk 49). 
He puts his view succinctly in 1673-75 : 
once we hold that every substance is active and every active thing is called a 
substance . . . we can show from the inner truths of metaphysics that what 
is not active is nothing . . . [and] that, in fact, every finite soul is embodied, 
even the angels are not excepted. (A VI.iii 158: W*64f.)31 
The ontology is clear. There is an infinite number of active incorpo- 
real substances. Of these, only God does not form an hypostatic 
union with some portion of matter. Created reality therefore con- 
sists of an infinity of individual corporeal substances and their 
modifications. 
Leibniz also expands upon the connection (implied by the conjunc- 
tion of the PSS and PSA) between the activity and self-sufficiency of 
substances: mind produces an indestructible and indivisible unit 
with the matter it organizes and it constitutes both the source of 
identity and individuation of that 0rganization.3~ Each of these new 
characterizations of mind depends on its constant activity, each is at 
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least partly motivated by theological concerns, and each becomes an 
important tenet in his mature philosophy. 
For Leibniz, the activity of mind renders it naturally indestructi- 
ble: "whatever acts cannot be destroyed" (A VI.iii 521: Pk 81)) nor 
"can [it] be dissolved naturally" (A VI.iii 393: Pk 47). That is, once 
God creates a mind, it is naturally unstoppable and hence indestruc- 
tible. But what about the proposed indestructibility and indivisibil- 
ity of the organization or unit it forms with matter? Since matter is 
divisible and since "whatever is divided is destroyed" (392: Pk 45), 
it is not immediately clear how the union of matter and mind is 
supposed to avoid divisibility and destruction. Once again, how- 
ever, the activity of mind guarantees survival. According to Leib- 
niz, whatever has one mind will be indivisible: "there comes into 
existence a body which is one and unsplittable, i.e., an atom, of 
whatever size it may be, whenever it has a single mind" (393: Pk 
47). Mind takes some portion of matter, acts as the "cement" of 
"the parts of matter," and thereby produces a "naturally indestructi- 
ble" atom (A VI.iii 474ff.: Pk z5ff.). Nor should the term atom 
mislead us: for Leibniz, an atom is indestructible, but it is not 
invariable; it is the fundamental unit of the physical world, but it 
is constituted of mind and matter. Mind functions as the meta- 
physical glue or "cement" of an atom or corporeal substance by 
persistently producing an organization with some chunk of matter; 
exactly which chunk it organizes is unimportant. When Wanda 
cuts her hair, her organization remains constant however much 
matter she sheds. The indivisibility and indestructibility of her 
unity follows from the organizational persistence of her mind. The 
organization will persist as long as her mind continues to act, as it 
always will, through some matter. Thus, the natural indivisibility 
and indestructibility of the union formed by mind and matter fol- 
low from two features of mind: that it is naturally unstoppable and 
that it will organize some matter as long as it acts. 
Two other functions of mind are closely related to its role as the 
metaphysical "cement" or organizational principle in the world. As 
the active principle in substance, mind constitutes both the identity 
of the substance whose cement it is and the source of its individua- 
tion. Leibniz is most explicit about the importance of this dual func- 
tion of mind in his comments about resurrection. In some important 
notes from the winter of 1675-76, he claims that one can easily solve 
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the theological problem by offering a proper account of the identity of 
the body. Because "all bodies" are made from "the same matter," it is 
not difficult "for the very same thing to be reproduced"; all that is 
required is that the same mind cause the reproduction (A VI.iii 240). 
That is, since the soul "is firmly planted in a flower of substance" 
which "subsists perpetually in all changes" and which can be "dif- 
fused" through the entire body or only some small part of it, it follows 
that "in the same way that individual salts" become reconstituted 
after being dissolved in water, so "any human individual" can be 
reconstituted after death (A VI.iii 478f). Because substantial identity 
depends wholly on the mind, as long as the mind remains the same so 
will the body or corporeal substance, regardless of which particular 
bits of matter come and go. There is then a very straightforward 
explanation of what occurs at resurrection: the flower of substance or 
soul, which at death shrank down to some minute portion of the 
original body, diffuses itself through an appropriate amount of matter 
(as it did during the individual's original growth from fetus to adult- 
hood, only faster) and thereby becomes the same body it was at death. 
The same body or atom exists both before and after the resurrection; 
it has merely changed significantly in size. The transformation that 
occurs at resurrection is a model (however dramatic) of what happens 
constantly among the bodies in the world. 
In the Paris years, Leibniz attaches increasingly greater metaphysi- 
cal importance to the activity of created minds and thereby makes 
substances increasingly more self-sufficient: by acting constantly on 
the matter to which it is attached, the mind or the principle of 
activity renders the resultant union a single, unstoppable, and natu- 
rally unsplittable thing such that, however much the matter may 
vary, the thing remains the same as long as its mind does. In short, 
the activity of mind is the source of the indestructibility, indivisibil- 
ity, individuality, and identity of corporeal substance. These are im- 
portant developments in Leibniz's theory of substance; it is now 
time to explore the precise relevance they have for his conception of 
harmonious plenitude. 
3.3 Mind  and  plenitude 
One of the striking things about Leibniz's notes on physics of 1672- 
73 is the theological importance attached to the activity of mind. An 
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argument that recurs throughout the period is one that proves the 
existence of minds from the diversity and harmony of things in the 
world. Its basic structure is as follows: because matter is everywhere 
the same, if there were only matter in the world, there would be no 
activity, diversity, or harmony; the world has such features: there- 
fore, there must be minds (e.g., A VI.ii: 57, 67, 72, 79, 100, 146). 
Leibniz thinks that this argument from diversity and harmony has 
far-reaching consequences: "all the most beautiful truths" concern- 
ing the universe, such as the variety of things and "the greatest of all 
truths," namely, harmony, depend on mind (A V1.iii 67). Because the 
world, as a product of God, has the greatest possible harmony and 
because mind is "the unique efficient cause of things," it follows 
that mind is the cause of the activity, diversity, and harmony of the 
world (146). It also follows that God, as the creator of mind, exists 
(see A VI.iii 67, 101). According to Leibniz, "nothing else demon- 
strated by me has greater significance" (A VI.iii 67). 
We have seen that between 1672 and 1676 Leibniz increases the 
metaphysical work of minds: they act constantly on the matter to 
which they are attached and thereby produce an indestructible corpo- 
real substance. It is significant that in his notes on physics of 1672 
Leibniz replaces the momentary minds of the pre-Paris years with 
eternal ones and that in 1676 he claims that harmonious plenitude 
entails the eternity of minds. According to Leibniz, "every mind is 
of endless duration" and "is indissolubly implanted in matter. . . . 
There are innumerable minds everywhere" which "do not perish" 
(A VI.iii 476f.: Pk' 31).33 
It is one thing for minds to be indestructible and quite another 
for them to be eternal: the constant activity of minds guarantees 
the natural indestructibility of substances, but it does not by itself 
guarantee their eternity. Once created, such substances will persist 
forever only if God deems their survival harmonious. But this is 
problematic: it is not at all obvious exactly how the eternity of 
substances is supposed to increase harmonious plenitude. For exam- 
ple, if God were to replace one infinite set of substances with a new 
one (say, one every millenium), would the universe not be rendered 
fuller? 
Leibniz explains his position in 1676. At the same time he reveals 
the motivation behind his doctrine of marks and traces and part of 
the motivation behind his hypothesis of expression.34 He writes: 
Downloaded from Cambridge Companions Onl e by IP 128.59.152.64 on Tu  Apr 09 20:42:24 WEST 2013.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521365880.004
Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2013
Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006
The  early period to  the Discourse on Metaphysics 91 
"There are beautiful discoveries and ingenious images with regard to 
the harmony of things" (A VI.iii 476: Pk 29). One of the most inge- 
nious images of his mature philosophy is presented in his essay "On 
the Secrets of the Sublime" of February, 1676, in which Leibniz first 
proclaims his commitment to harmony as a principle. He writes: 
"Particular minds exist, in sum, simply because the supreme being 
judges it harmonious that there should exist somewhere that which 
understands, or, is a kind of intellectual mirror or replica of the 
world" (A VI.iii 474: Pk 25).35 Leibniz explains his intention when he 
applies this metaphor to God: "A most perfect being is that which 
contains the most. Such a being is capable of ideas and thoughts, for 
this multiplies the varieties of things, like a mirror" (475, Pk 29; our 
emphasis). Created minds cannot contain all perfections, but they 
can reflect them all. That is, the image of a mirror, a prominent 
fixture of Leibniz's later philosophy, is motivated by a desire to in- 
crease the variety and content of the world as much as possible. It 
allows Leibniz to go beyond the maximization of objects to that of 
their images and ideas. He greatly increases the multitude and vari- 
ety of things by giving each indestructible mind at every moment of 
its eternal existence a perception or idea of the entire world. 
Within a few weeks of exhibiting this picture of the mind as a 
mirror, Leibniz expands upon it. He writes in March, 1676 that all 
minds have thoughts, each one of which is an action of mind; that 
each mind "senses all the endeavors" or activities of all the other 
minds; and that no activity of any mind "is ever lost" (A VI.iii 393: 
Pk 47). That is, minds not only sense all the activities of all the 
minds in the world, they also retain a memory or trace of them as 
well. In Leibniz's words, "[ilt is not credible that the effect of all 
perceptions should vanish in the future" (A VI.iii 5 10: Pk 61)' rather 
they must be "stored up in the mind" (A VI.iii 393: Pk 47). In April 
he presents the original version of what comes to be his doctrine of 
marks and traces: "there is present in any matter something which 
retains the effect of what precedes it, namely a mind"; but also 
"there is in it a quality of such a kind as to bring this [state of 
substance or effect] about" (A VI.iii 491: Pk 5 I) .  We will have the 
opportunity to talk about the significance of the doctrine of marks 
and traces for Leibniz's theories of expression and causation in the 
next section. In the present context its importance is that it adds 
significantly to the plenitude of the world: each mind at every mo- 
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ment includes an effect or trace of all it has done and sensed as well 
as a quality or mark of all it will do and sense. According to Leibniz, 
"no endeavor in the universe is lost; they are stored up in the mind, 
not destroyed" (A VI.iii 393: Pk 47). By making minds eternal, by 
allowing them to sense all endeavors, and by giving them traces of 
all that has gone before and marks of all that will occur, Leibniz has 
made each mind a mirror of the entire course of the world at every 
moment in time. Each mind reflects or expresses the entire world - 
past, present and future - at every moment of the mind's existence. 
But it is not enough for minds to be eternal, they must also be 
diverse. That is, harmonious plenitude requires not just that sub- 
stances eternally express the entire world, it demands that each does 
so from its own point of view. Leibniz writes: 
It seems to me that every mind is omniscient in a confused way; that any 
mind perceives simultaneously whatever happens in the entire world. . . . 
But time is infinitely divisible, and it is certain that at any moment the soul 
perceives various things. . . . Again, it is not surprising that any mind should 
perceive what is done in the entire world, since there is no body that is too 
small to sense all other things, given the plenitude of the world. And so a 
wonderful variety arises in this way, for there are as many different relations 
of things as there are minds, just as when the same town is seen from 
various places. So God, by the creation of many minds, willed to bring about 
with respect to the universe what is willed with respect to a large town by a 
painter, who wants to display delineations of its various aspects or projec- 
tions. The painter does on canvas what God does on the mind. 
(A VI.iii 524: Pk* 85)  
The image here is a powerful one. Each mind mirrors every aspect of 
the world from its own point of view so that there is not merely an 
infinity of substances and an infinity of complete pictures or reflec- 
tions of the world, there are infinitely many different pictures or 
expressions as well. 
The difference among perspectives is worth emphasizing. The de- 
sired pictorial fecundity requires that each substance be distinctive: 
in order to maximize the variety of images, each substance must 
have a perspective that is different from every other. This means 
that no two perspectives will be similar and, hence, that no two 
substances will be the same. We will have more to say about Leib- 
niz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles below, but it is worth 
noting here that within a month of formulating this idea of minds as 
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eternal mirrors he gives the first articulation of this principle (see A 
VI.iii 491: Pk 51). 
3.4 Mind and harmony 
Substances not only express the world in their own diverse ways, 
they do so in harmony with one another. As early as 1673-75, Leib- 
niz is prepared to write: "once we hold that every substance is ac- 
tive. . . we can show from the inner truths of metaphysics. . . that 
all forces act for the highest mind whose will is the final reason for 
all things, the cause being the universal harmony." Leibniz main- 
tains that "it is the task of Metaphysics to examine the continuous 
temporal modifications in the universe" and that the truths about 
these modifications will follow "once the true and inevitable con- 
cept of substance is understood" (A VI.iii 156f.: W* 6zff.). 
In early 1676 Leibniz was prompted to consider exactly how his 
theory of substance could fully explain "these continuous modifica- 
tions" and act toward universal harmony. The results of his rumina- 
tions include some of the central tenets of the metaphysics of the 
Discourse, namely, the doctrine of preestablished harmony, the prin- 
ciple of the identity of indiscemibles, and the idea that each sub- 
stance expresses the entire universe. We propose that the combina- 
tion of the original metaphysical principles and the newly proposed 
principle of harmony encouraged the development of these doctrines 
in the spring of 1676.3~ Since Leibniz maintains his characteristic 
silence about his deep motivations, the case for this proposal must 
be circumstantial, based on clues that Leibniz leaves along the way. 
Much of the progress Leibniz made in his account of the harmony 
among minds is inspired by his original principles; it therefore will 
be helpful to review some of the relevant implications of those prin- 
ciples. It follows from the PCS that p is a property of a substance S if 
and only if the nature of S is the cause of p. Given the PSR and the 
notion of a complete cause, this means that every property of S is 
caused by the nature of S in the sense that the nature of S constitutes 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of p. Given the PSR and the 
PSA, it follows that all the events in the world reduce to modifica- 
tions of substances. This consequence is important: when coupled 
with the Logical Assumption it implies that there are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for every state of the world and that these 
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conditions reside in the nature of substances; when combined with 
the Intelligibility Assumption it implies that these conditions are in 
theory both intelligible and discoverable in those natures. Thus, 
substances are the ultimate subjects of predication and in theory can 
offer an intelligible explanation for every event of the world. More- 
over, once Leibniz gives each substance its own active principle or 
mind so that it is the mind of S that constitutes its active principle, 
it follows that every property of S must originate in that mind in the 
sense that it is the mind of S that begins the process that produces 
the property. For instance, the property of Wanda walking is one that 
originated in some action in Wanda's mind although the complete 
reason for that property involves both the mind and the matter or 
passive principle through which it acts. 
There are two problems or tensions which the implications of 
these principles make evident but which are not resolved in Leib- 
niz's original metaphysics. According to the PSS and the PCS, the 
relation between a substance and property is such that the complete 
cause and explanation of the property is supposed to be discoverable 
in the nature of the substance to which it belongs. However, a prob- 
lem lurks here due to a slight tension between the PCS and the PSR: 
on the one hand, the PSR demands that there be a sufficient explana- 
tion for a property; on the other, the PCS claims that a property 
cannot be said to belong to a substance unless that explanation lies 
in the nature of the substance. What this means is that if the PCS 
extends only to some properties (say, essential ones) and not to oth- 
ers (say, accidental ones), then the latter cannot strictly be said to 
exist in the substance. In the early writings, Leibniz does not explain 
exactly how far the PCS extends. While he clearly believes, for in- 
stance, that Wanda's walking down the street is caused by her na- 
ture, it is unclear what he thinks about the mud on her boots. Since 
the complete cause and explanation of the mud would seem to in- 
volve substances other than just Wanda, it is not at all clear to whom 
or what the property belongs. 
The second problem arises from an epistemological asymmetry in 
the relation between a cause and its effect in Leibniz's original princi- 
ples. The notion of complete reason maintains that the understand- 
ing of a cause entails full knowledge of its effect: one sees exactly 
why the effect and no other occurred. But the principles are silent 
about any such entailment from effect to cause. Since the Intelligibil- 
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ity Assumption implies that a property p of a substance S is rendered 
intelligible (at least in theory) by a consideration of S's nature, one 
would think that a full understanding of p requires that one know 
enough about S to see exactly how S caused p. In other words, the 
principles suggest that a thorough understanding of p would involve 
S in fairly significant ways. It is therefore odd that neither in the 
principles nor in his articulation of the early metaphysics does Leib- 
niz say anything explicit about the epistemological work that an 
effect does for its cause. 
We have argued that Leibniz's conception of harmony influenced 
his investigations about the activity of substances; in particular, we 
have suggested that some important doctrines (e.g., that minds have 
marks and traces) were developed in response to that conception's 
demand for plenitude and variety. The principle of harmony also 
prodded him to think a bit harder about the precise relationship 
between substantial natures and the properties they cause. In par- 
ticular, its demand for mutual coordination among substances led 
Leibniz to develop a more thoroughgoing account of the relationship 
between the actions of minds and the production of substantial prop- 
erties. As we shall see, in 1676 he developed solutions to the prob- 
lems just noted. We will now trace the steps that Leibniz took to- 
ward those solutions. 
On I I February I 676, in the same essay in which he first explicitly 
states his principle of harmony, Leibniz articulates his assumptions 
about the harmonious activities of minds. He ends "On the Secrets 
of the Sublime" by noting that "God arranged things from the begin- 
ning" so that minds can "understand their function" and accord- 
ingly attain the "wonderful uses" to which they "are destined by 
providence" (A VI.iii 477: Pk* 31).3' In an essay of early 1676 he 
offers a definition crucial to his account of how God might so ar- 
range things: "A rule [regula] is an instrument of action, determin- 
ing the form of the action by the perpetual and successive applica- 
tion of the agent to the parts of the instrument." From the examples 
he gives it is clear that a rule not only specifies what the actor does, 
but the order in which she does it. According to Leibniz a footpath 
across a plain is a rule, but a compass is not. He explains: "The 
instruction which an emperor gives to a deputy. . . is a rule if it is 
written so that the deputy, in his action, can only follow it in order" 
(483: Pk 39). With this conception of a rule as an instrument of 
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action, Leibniz was in a position to articulate a production rule for 
the activities of minds. 
In a series of essays written in March and April, he analyzes the 
relationship between God and the universe. These essays are both 
important and obscure: they offer critical insight into the evolution 
of Leibniz's ideas on our topic, but they also depend on certain 
difficult neo-Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines. Fortunately we 
need not bother with the complicated details of the latter.@ What is 
significant about these texts is that they offer two somewhat differ- 
ent characterizations of God's relation to the world. Each of these 
provides a clue to Leibniz's underlying assumptions about how 
minds function as the source of the world's harmony. 
Leibniz defines God as "the subject of all absolute simple forms - 
absolute, that is affirmative" (A VI.iii 519: Pk 79). "Form" here 
refers to a kind of Platonic form or essence, so that God contains all 
positive essences. Thus, God can be thought of as "the conjunction 
in the same subject of all possible absolute forms or perfections (52  I: 
Pk 81)." Particular substances arise when the combinations or modi- 
fications of these forms are instantiated in a subject: "The various 
results of forms, combined with a subject, bring it about that particu- 
lars result" (523: Pk 85). Each subject is distinct, although each 
expresses both the world and the essence of God. The difficult de- 
tails of this account of creation are extraneous to our topic. What is 
important for our present purpose is that in describing the relation- 
ship between the creator and its creation Leibniz reveals a good deal 
about how the individual creatures function in that world. He 
writes: 
since the ultimate reason of things is unique, and contains by itself the 
aggregate of all the requisites of all things, it is evident that the requisites of 
all things are the same. So also is their essence. . . . Therefore the essence of 
all things is the same, and things differ only modally, just as a town seen 
from a high point differs from the town seen from a plain. 
(A VI.iii 573: Pk 93f.)39 
We need to proceed cautiously here. In this passage Leibniz explains 
that God (the ultimate reason of things) is unique and contains the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of all things. It 
is supposed to follow that the essence of all things is the same. But 
this seems problematic since it appears to conflict with his view 
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that each substantial nature differs from every other. Leibniz offers 
the crux of a solution in a related text: 
It seems to me that the origin of things from God is of the same kind as the 
origin of properties from an essence; just as 6 = I + I + I + I + I  +I, therefore 6 
= 3+3, = 3 ~ 2 ,  = 4+2, etc. Nor may one doubt that the one expression 
differs from the other. . . . So just as these properties differ from each other 
and from essence, so do things differ from each other and from God. 
(A VI.iii 518f.: Pk 77) 
With this material in hand we can resolve the apparent tension and 
discern the first significant evidence of Leibniz's production rule for 
the activities of mind. 
According to Leibniz, each created substance is an expression of 
God's essence and in this sense each has the same essence. But each 
nonetheless differs from every other because it is a different expres- 
sion of that essence or, as Leibniz suggests in the previous quotation, 
it is a modification of that essence. An analogy may help to grasp 
Leibniz's point. We can think of the essence expressed in the world 
as a series of true propositions and each modification of that essence 
as a corresponding series of sentences in a language. Following this 
analogy, each substance expresses the same series of propositions, 
but each does so in a different language. Because the sentences in, 
say, Italian will be different from those in Arabic which will be 
different again from those in Russian, each series will be a different 
way of expressing the same thing. According to Leibniz, then, there 
is an essence (of infinite complexity) that God has chosen to instanti- 
ate in the world by means of an infinite number of different expres- 
sions. On this account, God creates each substance so that it will 
express that essence in its own way. As each series of sentences is a 
different expression of the same propositions, so each substance is a 
different expression of the same essence. 
There is good textual evidence to support this interpretation of the 
relation between the essence of God and the expression of substances. 
The analogies used by Leibniz during the period offer particularly 
vivid support. In the comparison to arithmetical expressions (exam- 
ples of which we have already seen), there is an essence, say 6, that 
God intends to express in different ways, say, 3 + 3, 2+4, I + 5 ,  etc. In 
the analogy to ideal representations of a town (an example of which 
occurs in the long quotation on p. 92), the point seems to be that in 
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order to represent or express the essence of the town, the best one can 
do is to represent it from a variety of perspectives. An important use of 
the town analogy appears in December, 1676: 
There is no doubt that God understands how we perceive things; just as 
someone who wants to provide a perfect conception of a town will represent 
it in several ways. And this understanding of God, in so far as it understands 
our way of understanding, is very like our understanding. Indeed our under- 
standing results from it, from which we can say that God has an understand- 
ing that is in a way like ours. For God understands things as we do but with 
this difference: that he understands them at the same time in infinitely 
many ways, whereas we understand them in one way only. 
(A VI.iii 400: Pk I I 5 )  
As in the arithmetical case, in creating the world, God creates differ- 
ent perspectives or expressions of the same thing. It is in this sense 
that our understanding or perspective "results from" God. Each sub- 
stance is created by God so as to be a unique expression of the divine 
essence; and it is the nature of the individual substance to be that 
unique expres~ion.4~ 
The second way in which Leibniz characterizes the relation be- 
tween God and the world in the relevant essays provides another 
important clue to his views about the the means by which minds act 
harmoniously. Elaborating on the Aristotelian notion of active intel- 
lect, Leibniz defines God as "the primary intelligence, in so far as he 
is omniscient." This same omniscience is "ascribed in a limited way 
to other things which are said to perceive something," i.e., to minds 
(A VI.iii 520: Pk 79). Leibniz also maintains that there are "infinitely 
many" perceptions of mind which "are not explicable in terms of 
each other," but which follow from mind "as properties result from 
essence" (521: Pk 81). He writes: 
it can be shown that the mind is continually changed, with the exception of 
that in us which is divine, or, comes from outside. In sum, . . . there is 
something divine in mind, which is what Aristotle used to call the active 
intellect, and this is the same as the omniscience of God. 
(A VI.iii 391: Pk 43) 
It is important that this divine, omniscient element in mind comes 
"from the outside," remains the same through its constant changes, 
and acts as the cause of those changes. Leibniz distinguishes be- 
tween mind and its actions by noting that the former "remains 
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always the same during change," while the latter are discrete produc- 
tions of the soul or mind (A VI.iii 326; see also A VI.iii 524: Pk 85). 
But what precisely is it about mind that is both omniscient and 
divine? We propose that these features apply to a mind insofar as 
God has given it a production rule in terms of which it can act in 
harmony with all other minds and express the entire universe. The 
production rule is a kind of blueprint for the continuous production 
of the discrete states of the substance so that each mind is a princi- 
ple of activity replete with its own set of instructions that tells it 
how to act and what to perceive at every moment of its existence. 
Following Leibniz's definition of a rule, we assume that the produc- 
tion rule for substantial properties is something that the mind "can 
only follow. . . in order." So, if S lives from t~ to tn and is in a 
different state at each moment of its existence, then at every mo- 
ment of S's life there will be some instruction about what to do or 
what to express next. The present state q occurring at t together 
with the instructions will determine what S does at t + ~ .  In this 
case, the complete cause and full explanation of q+ I will be found 
in the nature of S. In other words, the complete cause of each state of 
the substance is the conjunction of the principle of activity, the 
production rule, and the previous state.41 
That in early 1676 Leibniz needed a way to explain the coordina- 
tion and harmony among substances is clear, as is the fact that the 
explanation had to be simple and had to accommodate the other 
features of substance (e.g., their indestructibility and eternity). With 
the development of the production rule for the activities of mind 
Leibniz had procured an elegant way to achieve these ends. As Leib- 
niz puts it in December, I 676: 
The harmony of things requires that there should be in bodies beings that 
act on themselves [quae agerent in se ipsa]. On the nature of a being that 
acts on itself: it acts by the simplest means, for in that there is harmony. 
Once it has begun, it is eternal. There are ideas in it of those things it has 
sensed and done, as there are in God; the difference is that in God the ideas 
are of all things and are simultaneous. . . . Thought [cogitatio] or the sensa- 
tion of oneself, i.e., action on oneself, is necessarily continued. 
(A VI.iii 588: Pk 113) 
By means of a divinely arranged production rule, each mind acts 
simply and eternally on itself expressing the divine essence from its 
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own perspective but in perfect harmony with the infinite number of 
other eternal representations of that essence. 
The evolution of Leibniz's production rule for the activities of 
mind is a dramatic achievement. But how dramatic? We propose 
that it gave Leibniz the conceptual means to construct the original 
version of the doctrine of preestablished harmony. This doctrine, 
which is one of the central tenets of Leibniz's mature thought, 
claims that God created finite substances so that they do not caus- 
ally interact, but harmonize with one another in virtue of their 
internal nature. The doctrine is interpreted in various ways, but is 
usually understood to include the following three claims: ( I )  that 
each state of an individual substance is caused by something inter- 
nal to its nature, (2 )  that the states of substances correspond per- 
fectly with one another, and ( 3 )  that substances do not causally 
interact or, more precisely, that no state of a substance has as a real 
cause some state of another substance. 
Because of the central role this doctrine plays in his mature 
thought, it is important to proceed with care. The production rule 
for the activities of mind is equivalent to ( I ) ,  but Leibniz's accep- 
tance of ( I )  does not by itself entail commitment to either (2)  or ( 3 ) .  
We will now argue, however, that by April, 1676 Leibniz was com- 
mitted to these three doctrines, although he did not yet call their 
conjunction preestablished harmony.4" 
' During the same two months in which Leibniz was so intensely 
examining the relation between God and the world and the means 
by which minds act, he was analyzing what explains the coherence 
of our sensations. On 15 April, in an important essay entitled "On 
Truths, the Mind, God, and the Universe," he writes: 
On due consideration, only this is certain: that we sense, and that we sense 
in a consistent way [congruenter], and that a certain rule [regulam] is ob- 
served by us in sensing. For something to be sensed in a consistent way is for 
it to be sensed in such a way that a reason can be given for everything and 
everything can be predicted. (A VI.iii S I I :  Pkt 6 3 )  
According to Leibniz here, on the basis of the consistency of our 
sensations we can infer that there is a reason for everything, that 
everything can be predicted, and that in sensing we observe a rule. 
Two questions arise at this point: what exactly is the cause of the 
consistency of sensations and how is that cause a rule? From the text 
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so far quoted, the consistency of sensations could be caused either 
by something internal to the mind, like a production rule, or by 
something external to it, like the physical world. Leibniz clarifies 
matters in what follows. He continues: 
This is what existence consists in - namely, in sensation that follows cer- 
tain laws [leges]. . . . Further, it consists in the fact that several people sense 
the same, and sense consistently [~onsentientia]~ and that diverse minds 
sense themselves and their own effects. From this it follows that there is 
one and the same cause that causes our own and others' sensations. Never- 
theless it is not necessary either that we act on them or that they act on us, 
but only that we sense with such conformity; and necessarily so, on account 
of the sameness of the cause. . . . Therefore there is no reason why we 
should ask whether there exist certain bodies outside us. . . . [I]t does not 
follow that there exists anything but sensation, and the cause of this sensa- 
tion and its consistency. (A VI.iii 5 I I :  Pk* 63f.) 
This text makes clear that, in order to explain existence, it is unneces- 
sary to resort to outside bodies. Leibniz proposes that we reduce exis- 
tence to the consistency of sensations, where the latter includes both 
the consistency of the sensation within a mind and the\ coordination 
among minds. There is no reason to ask whether bodies exist outside 
us because the consistency of sensations and coordination among 
minds can be explained elsewhere. Although Leibniz is not explicit 
about what this cause is, he offers some details about what it does: the 
cause produces the consistency of sensations within a mind and the 
coordination of sensations among minds; it offers a reason for every- 
thing and a means of predicting everything; and it somehow involves 
diverse minds sensing "themselves and their own effects" in a way 
that does not require that they act on one another. That is, assuming 
that the cause is somehow internal, what the cause does is produce 
preestablished harmony.43 Leibniz writes: 
the mind will be created by God, since it will exist and remain by the will of 
God, that is, by the will of the good intellect. For to exist is simply to be 
understood to be good. Existence is stated equivocally of bodies and of our 
mind. We sense or perceive that we exist; when we say that bodies exist, we 
mean that there exist certain consistent sensations, having a particular con- 
stant cause. Just as 3 is one thing, and I, I,I is another - for 3 is I + I + I .  In 
such a way, the form of 3 is different from all its parts; so creatures differ 
from God, who is all things. Creatures are certain things. 
(A VI.iii 5 12: Pk* 65f.) 
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We noted in section I that Leibniz describes his papers of the 
period as "poorly expressed vestiges of hasty reflections" (A VI.iii 
5331, ,and his essays of March/April, 1676 are surely obscure. But 
large sections of these texts are rendered transparent once we see 
them as describing a world in which each substance expresses the 
essence of God from its own perspective and does so because of its 
production rule (Cf. A VI.iii 508f.: Pk 57ff.; 5 14: Pk 69; and esp. 588: 
Pk 113).44 For example, once we realize that the missing "single 
cause" in "On Truth, the Mind, God, and the Universe" is the es- 
sence of God and once we grasp that the notion of rule employed 
there is that of a production rule for the activity of mind (the in- 
stantiation of that essence in a single substance), we are able to 
make out the full significance of the text. In short, once we under- 
stand that the notes of MarchIApril, 1676 assume the production 
rule, we can discern the doctrine of preestablished harmony. 
Other texts offer further evidence for the acceptance of claims (2)  
and (3). In an essay of December, 1676 Leibniz maintains: "We have 
no idea of existence, other than that we understand things to be 
sensed. . . . Without sentient beings, nothing [in the created world] 
would exist. Without one primary sentient being, which is the same 
as the cause of all things, nothing would be sensed" (A VI.iii 588: Pk 
I 13). We sense things not because there are external objects acting 
on us, but because God has given each mind a "certain rule." It is 
because of this rule that there is a reason for everything and every- 
thing can be predicted. 
We have already noted that in "On Truth, the Mind, God, and 
the Universe" Leibniz proposes that there is a rule that "several 
people sense the same, and sense consistently." In the same work 
he talks about the coherence "among minds" (A VI.iii 512: Pk 67). 
The implication is that the states of substances correspond per- 
fectly because each state of an individual substance is caused by 
something internal to its nature and because those internal natures 
have been coordinated. Leibniz makes this point explicit in the 
same essay in which he first presents his definition of a rule. He 
writes: "if we were perfectly knowing, i.e., if we were gods, we 
would easily see that those things which, because of our ignorance, 
now appear to exist at the same time by accident, CO-exist by their 
very nature, i.e., by the necessity of the divine intellect" (A VI.iii 
484: Pk 41). 
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Nor should we be surprised that Leibniz develops his doctrine of 
preestablished harmony during this period: in a fairly straightfor- 
ward way it follows from the second conception of substance, the 
PSR, and the PCS when the latter is extended to all substantial 
properties. As we noted earlier, there is a tension between the PSR 
and PCS. The unresolved problem of the pre-Paris years was whether 
or not to extend the PCS to all substantial properties or only some 
(say, the essential ones). Leibniz's production rule for the activities 
of mind gave him a way to extend the PCS to all substantial proper- 
ties and his desire for harmony demanded that the activities of cre- 
ated minds be harmonized so as to reflect God's goodness. The result 
is a world of substances whose self-sufficient natures extend to all 
their properties, both essential and accidental. 
In 1676, Leibniz also managed to solve another problem left over 
from his pre-Paris years. His solution constitutes another important 
advancement in his thought; and it offers further evidence of his 
acceptance of preestablished harmony. As noted at the beginning of 
this section, there is an epistemological asymmetry between a cause 
and its effect in his original metaphysical principles. While the prin- 
ciples suggest that a thorough understanding of a property p would 
require significant knowledge of the substantial nature to which p 
belongs (or at least the part of that nature that caused p), Leibniz is 
silent on this matter. He breaks this awkward silence in April, 1676 
when he first begins to claim that "[aln effect is conceived through 
its cause" (A VI.iii 5 14: Pk 71). Nor should Leibniz's sudden interest 
in the epistemological connection between an effect and its cause 
come as a surprise: given his Logical and Intelligibility Assump- 
tions, his newly developed production rule for the activities of 
minds entails that the necessary and sufficient conditions of any 
state (or effect) of a substance S would exist in S and in theory be 
intelligible. 
Leibniz argues at length for just this sort of relation between a 
substance and its states in one of the most important essays of the 
period. He begins "A Meditation on the Principle of the Individual" 
of I April 1676 by writing: "We say that the effect involves its 
cause; that is, in such a way that whoever understands some effect 
perfectly will also arrive at knowledge of its cause. For it is neces- 
sary that there is a certain connection between a complete cause 
and the effect" (A VI.iii 490: Pk* 5 I). Leibniz then poses an appar- 
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ent counterexample to this theory: in some cases "different causes 
can produce an effect that is perfectly the same." His immediate 
response to this potential problem is important. He denies that 
there could ever be such a case and claims that "we are certain, 
from some other source, that the effect does involve its cause," and 
therefore that "it is necessary that the method of production must 
always be discernible" in the effect.4~ It is "impossible" that two 
effects could be perfectly similar "for they will consist of matter" 
which "will have a mind" such that "the mind will retain the 
effect of its former state." He does not explain what this "other 
source" of certainty is, but attempts to demonstrate his claim by 
means of a reductio ad absurdum. He argues that if any two indi- 
viduals were perfectly similar, three unacceptable conclusions 
would result: "the effect would not involve its cause"; "the princi- 
ple of individuation" would be "outside the thing, in its cause"; 
and "one individual would not differ from another in itself." It is 
important that Leibniz does not feel the need to explain why these 
results are absurd. He seems to have taken their untenability to be 
obvious. And of course it is obvious given his newly developed 
ideas: since each mind has its own production rule of the sort 
articulated above and since harmonious plenitude requires that 
each substance expresses God's essence from its own perspective, it 
follows that each substance has its own distinct production rule. 
That is, because a rule would make each substance distinct from 
every other, the principle of individuation of the substance would 
have to be in the thing itself and because no two rules could be the 
same, no two individuals could be the same either. 
So far so good. But how exactly does the effect involve its cause? 
Leibniz continues his discussion: 
But if we admit that two different things always differ in themselves in 
some respect as well, it follows that there is present in any matter some- 
thing that retains the effect of what precedes it, namely, a mind. And from 
this it is also proved that the effect involves the cause. For it is true of it that 
it was produced by such a cause; therefore right up to the present there is in 
it a quality of such a kind as to bring this about, and this quality. . . has 
about it something that is real. It is evident what great consequences follow 
from such little premises. [A V1.iii 491: Pk 51) 
Great consequences indeed: the effect involves its cause because, 
for any effect, it is caused by the mind in the substance from which 
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it results and that mind not only has traces of all it has done, it has 
a quality that acts as the real cause of that effect. If we understand 
this quality to be conjoined with a production rule, then it would 
seem to follow, as Leibniz put it at the first of the essay, that "the 
effect involves its cause. . . in such a way that whoever under- 
stands some effect perfectly will also arrive at knowledge of its 
cause." But what is it one knows when one knows the cause? Our 
notion of a production rule reveals Leibniz's point: since a com- 
plete cause includes the necessary and sufficient conditions of an 
effect, through a perfect understanding of the effect one would ac- 
quire knowledge of at least the previous state of the substance and 
the relevant part of the production rule. That is, for some effect or 
state q of a substance S, a perfect understanding of q+ I would lead 
to knowledge of q and the part of the production rule that would 
entail q + ~  given q. One of the "great consequences" of Leibniz's 
essay is that it assumes something quite like our notion of a pro- 
duction rule in an attempt to show that every effect involves its 
cause. Moreover, an effect would not involve its cause in the way 
Leibniz's argument demands, if claims ( I )  and ( 3 )  were not both 
assumed. 
We propose that Leibniz's sudden desire to show that "whoever 
understands some effect perfectly will also arrive at the knowledge 
of its cause" grew out of his newly evolved conception of a produc- 
tion rule. Once Leibniz had decided upon the latter and decided that 
substances do not causally interact, he was free to reform the episte- 
mological asymmetry of his original principles. Before an effect 
could lead back to its cause, there had to be only one way to produce 
an effect. Or, to put it another way, once Leibniz decided to extend 
the PCS to all the properties of a substance (i.e., once he came to 
accept claims ( I )  and (3) ) ,  it would follow that an effect could be 
produced in only one way and hence that every effect would have to 
be "conceived through its ~ause."4~ 
We are now prepared to return to a point we made in section 3.3 
about plenitude and the original version of the principle of the iden- 
tity of indiscernibles, which first appears in "A Meditation on the 
Principle of the Individual." We suggested there that Leibniz's desire 
for both substantial and pictorial fecundity may have been part of 
the motivation behind the development of that principle. We can 
now see that the principle constitutes one of the fundamental as- 
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sumptions of the essay. Leibniz assumes from the outset that no two 
individuals can be exactly similar. It would seem that once Leibniz 
had developed the idea of a production rule, he had a neat way of 
making each individual distinct: each substance has its own unique 
"instrument of action." 
But there was another important result of Leibniz's newly evolved 
preestablished harmony. In the winter and spring of 1676, Leibniz 
was making great strides in the development of his views about the 
activities of mind. He was not as successful on the topic of matter. 
In an essay of March, 1676 he poses a number of problems for which 
he does not have answers.47 One of the most pressing of these con- 
cerns the precise relation between body and mind. According to 
Leibniz: "As mind is something which has a certain relation to 
some portion of matter, then it must be stated why it extends itself 
to this portion and not to all adjacent portions; or why it is that 
some body, and not every body, belongs to it in the same way" (A 
VI.iii 392: Pk 45). It was not until late 1676 that we find a solution 
to this problem. His solution, which constitutes an important devel- 
opment in Leibniz's views about body, might well have been in- 
spired by the development of his original version of preestablished 
harmony, especially claims ( I )  and (2). For the first time Leibniz 
makes a distinction between bodies as aggregates and bodies as ele- 
ments. He writes: "Every body which is an aggregate can be de- 
stroyed. There seem to be elements, i.e., indestructible bodies, be- 
cause there is a mind in them" (A VI.iii 521: Pk 81). Atoms are "the 
fundamental elements" out of which "cohering bodies arise" so that 
"all things come from" them (A VI.iii 585: Pk 109). In other words, 
there are bodies whose parts are separable and bodies whose parts 
are not; the latter make up the former (A VI.iii 473f.: Pk 23f.). One 
of the most explicit statements of this position appears in Decem- 
ber I 676. Leibniz writes: 
A substance or complete Being is for me that which alone involves all 
things, or for the perfect understanding of which, no other thing needs to be 
understood. A figure [figura] is not of this kind, for in order to understand 
from what a figure [figura] of such and such a kind has arisen, there must be 
a recourse to motion. Each complete being can be produced in only one way: 
that figures [figurae] can be produced in various ways is enough to indicate 
that they are not complete Beings. (A VI.iii 400: Pk' I I 
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Once Leibniz has conceived of the minds in corporeal substances as 
capable of perceiving and sensing everything else in the world in a 
harmonized fashion, it is not difficult to think of a collection of such 
atoms forming an aggregate among themselves. Such an entity 
would not be a substance, but would be formed of substances; and, 
as a collection of atoms, it could be produced in any number of ways. 
It would not be a complete being itself because it would not have its 
own principle of activity to which it owed its being; rather it would 
owe its being to the activity of the minds in the atoms which make 
it up. 
A final point to make about the evolution of Leibniz's thought 
during 1672-76 is that the materials are in place for the develop- 
ment of his complete concept theory of substance. According to 
that theory, S is an individual substance just in case its concept 
contains all and only the concepts of those properties that may be 
attributed to it. According to Leibniz in the quotation above, "[a] 
substance or complete Being is for me that which alone involves 
everything, or for the perfect understanding of which, no other 
thing needs to be understood" (A VI.iii 400: Pk I I S ) .  Such a posi- 
tion would follow fairly straightforwardly from Leibniz's notion of 
a production rule for the activities of minds: to understand per- 
fectly the production rule would be to understand "everything" 
about the substance. As we shall now see, it would not take Leib- 
niz long to characterize substance as that which has a complete 
concept. 
4 1679 T O  THE D I S C O U R S E  O N  M E T A P H Y S I C S  
In April, 1679 Leibniz formulated an original series of logical 
systems for testing formal validity (C42-92). It is in these papers 
that Leibniz put front and center the concept containment ac- 
count of truth, which he then presented as the source of his meta- 
physics of individual substance in The Discourse on Metaphysics, 
and the subsequent correspondence with Antoine Arnauld. Indeed, 
the systems developed in the April, 1679 papers are all based on 
the concept containment account of truth, i.e., put somewhat 
loosely, the thesis that an affirmative categorical proposition is 
true just in case the concept of its predicate is contained in the 
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concept of its subject. In the second of the papers in the series 
Leibniz said as much. 
In order to make evident the use of characteristic numbers in propositions it 
must be considered that every true categorical affirmative universal proposi- 
tion signifies nothing other than some connection between predicate and 
subject (in the non-oblique case, which is always meant here), so that the 
predicate is said to be in the subject, or contained in the subject, either 
absolutely and regarded in itself, or at any rate in some instance, i.e., the 
subject is said to contain the predicate in the fashion stated. That is to say 
that the concept of the subject, either in itself or with some addition, in- 
volves the concept of the predicate. ( C ~ I :  PLP18-19) 
Note that in this passage Leibniz began with a version of the concept 
containment account of truth restricted to universal propositions. 
But in the closing sentence of the passage, with the phrase "or with 
some addition," Leibniz prepared the way for a generalization of the 
concept containment account of truth to all categorical affirmative 
propositions. Leibniz's logical papers from this period make it plausi- 
ble to ascribe to him the view that an adequate theory of truth for cat- 
egorical affirmative propositions will settle the truth conditions for 
all propositions. Hence, although a full statement of Leibniz's con- 
cept containment account of truth would be quite complex, the idea 
that truth is a matter of relations among concepts is surely its basis. 
Numerous problems arise for the student of Leibniz by virtue of 
ascribing the concept containment account of truth to him, includ- 
ing these two crucial questions: ( I )  what tempted him to accept it, 
and (2) what did he take to be its relevance for his metaphysics of 
substance? The first question is surely burning, since the concept 
containment account of truth seems to imply that a proposition is 
true just in case it is conceptually true, and, hence, to imply that a 
proposition is true just in case it is necessarily true. Yet we know 
from a number of papers written during our time period that Leibniz 
rejected the thesis that if a proposition is true then it is necessarily 
true.49 So why on earth did Leibniz accept an account of truth that, 
as he himself noted, exacerbates the problem of establishing that 
there are contingent truths? In his seminal work, La Logique de 
Leibniz, Couturat suggested that Leibniz saw the concept contain- 
ment account of truth as a consequence of the principle of sufficient 
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reason, a thesis that he took as an axiom in his system.so Fabrizio 
Mondadori has recommended an alternative account, again utilizing 
the bedrock character of the principle of sufficient reason in Leib- 
niz's system. His idea is this: the fact is that given Leibniz's sharpest 
characterizations of the truth definition and the principle of suffi- 
cient reason, the latter is a consequence of the former. Hence, 
Mondadori suggests, Leibniz accepted the former because it has the 
latter as a consequence.sl 
There is a lot to be said for these efforts, especially Mondadori's 
subtle account. We want to recommend consideration of an alter- 
nate strategy in which the concept containment of truth is viewed 
as motivated, at least in part, by what Leibniz considered to be its 
consequences for the metaphysics of individual substances. It is 
well to have a number of alternative explanations for Leibniz's 
intellectual motivations for accepting the concept containment ac- 
count of truth, since all answers to our first question seem un- 
derdetermined by the textual evidence currently available. And 
there is no reason to expect the discovery of a "smoking gun" text 
on this matter; here we have a question that probably will not 
receive a definitive answer. 
Let us look at the second question. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Dis- 
course on Metaphysics surely suggest this answer: Leibniz claimed 
that the concept containment account of truth, when applied to singu- 
lar propositions, has the consequence that the concept of an individ- 
ual substance is complete, i.e., "is sufficient . . . to allow the deduc- 
tion from it of all the predicates of the subject to which this concept is 
attributed." And in Paragraph 9 Leibniz seems to have claimed that 
the thesis that an entity is an individual substance if and only if its 
concept is complete has the following weighty metaphysical conse- 
quences: the identity of indiscernibles, the thesis that substances 
begin only by creation and perish only by annihilation, and the thesis 
that each substance expresses every other and, hence, is quasi- 
omniscient and quasi-omnipotent since each substance perceives ev- 
ery other and is such that every other substance accommodates, in 
some measure, to it. 
When we examine relations among the concept containment ac- 
count of truth, the complete concept theory of individual sub- 
stance, and various Leibnizian theses about individual substances 
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(including those just noted from Discourse g), the conclusion just 
has to be that matters are vastly more complicated than Leibniz's 
easy prose in these paragraphs would suggest and that versions of 
the deep metaphysical principles unearthed in section 1.2 are at 
work once again. Indeed, we suggest that the following description 
of Leibniz's reasoning provides at least as plausible an account as 
does the more traditional one limned above. First, we propose that 
the original metaphysical principles conjoined with the decision to 
extend the PSS and PCS to all substantial properties entails that 
each of a substance's properties is related to it in such fashion as to 
imply that the concept of an individual substance is complete. We 
then note that this result makes plausible the claim that the con- 
cept containment account of truth holds for affirmative categorical 
singular propositions whose singular subject terms refer to individ- 
ual substances. Next we note that in the traditions in which Leib- 
niz worked "individual substance" was code for a basic individual 
in one's ontology, so that once truth conditions were set for affirma- 
tive categorical singular propositions whose singular subject terms 
refer to individual substance, truth conditions are set for proposi- 
tions of the same variety about individuals, basic or nonbasic. The 
general structure of Leibniz's proposal for extending the truth defi- 
nition may be gleaned from the April 1679 logical papers previ- 
ously noted. 
Various authors have attempted explanations of Leibniz's reason- 
ing along lines similar to those just rec0mmended.s~ It is not our 
purpose here to offer the details of such an explanation, but rather to 
note Leibniz's use of the deep metaphysical principles in formulat- 
ing and refining his ideas about individual substances in the seminal 
period from the April, 1679 logic papers through The Discourse on 
Metaphysics and the ensuing correspondence with Antoine Ar- 
nauld. It is in this period that Leibniz solidified his thinking concern- 
ing the intension of the term "individual substance," characterizing 
it in terms of his various metaphysical theses about the nature of 
complete entities. Among the relevant metaphysical theses are 
these: where S is an individual substance, Leibniz held in this period 
that S remains genuinely numerically the same over time; each state 
of S contains traces of all that S has been and marks of all that S will 
be (the doctrine of marks and traces); the identity of indiscemibles 
holds of S; each state of S, other than its initial state and any of its 
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states caused miraculously, is caused by preceding states of S (the 
doctrine of spontaneity); S is incorruptible and ingenerable; S ex- 
presses the entire universe; S is indivisible; and S has true, substan- 
tial unity.53 
While Leibniz was confident in the time period under consider- 
ation that an entity must satisfy the conditions just noted in order 
to be an individual substance, a complete entity, i.e., a basic individ- 
ual, he was less secure than he was to become about what sorts of 
entities satisfy those conditions. We know that his final position is 
that only monads satisfy all the requisite conditions; we know that 
in our period he held that only entities with substantial forms 
satisfy all the requisite conditions. A disputed question is whether 
he held in our period that there are extended entities informed by 
substantial forms that satisfy all the requisite conditions, which 
are basic individual entities. In part, resolution of this question of 
interpretation turns on obtaining proper perspective on Leibniz's 
attitude toward the attribute of extension in the time period under 
consideration.54 
Leibniz's early metaphysical writings are brilliant and original, 
indeed, idiosyncratic. In his metaphysical writings in the period 
from 1679 through 1686, Leibniz made a genuine effort to connect 
his views with traditional metaphysical offerings. In particular, he 
emphasized a connection he envisaged between his own idiosyn- 
cratic principles concerning individual substances, and the tra- 
ditional notion that, in order to be a genuine individual substance, 
an entity must possess strict numerical identity over time. In a 
piece entitled "De Mundo Praesenti," contained in the Vorau- 
sedition, but otherwise unpublished, Leibniz provided a taxonomy 
of the kinds of being he was prepared to discuss, first distinguishing 
between real and imaginary beings, and then, within the class of 
real beings, between beings per se, and beings per accidens, arguing 
that beings through aggregation are instances of beings per acci- 
dens, and that in order to reach the level of a being per se, an 
individual must possess a substantial form (LH IV 7 C B1 111-14; 
VE 416-23). These ideas are repeated in numerous places in The 
Discourse on Metaphysics and the correspondence with Arnuald. 
They are connected with the requirement of strict numerical iden- 
tity over time in the important paper "Notationes Generales," part 
of which was published by Grua, all of which is contained in the 
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Vorausedition (Gr 322-34; VE 184-90). There Leibniz took a hu- 
man person as a paradigm of an individual substance - a being per 
se, and an army as a paradigm of a nonbasic individual - a being per 
accidens. He wrote: 
It is worth investigating in what way a being through aggregation, such as 
an army or even a disorganized multitude of men, is one; and in what way 
its unity and reality differ from the unity and reality of a man. . . . The 
chief point is this: an army accurately considered is not the same thing 
even for a moment, for it has nothing real in itself that does not result 
from the reality of the parts from which it is aggregated; and since its 
entire nature consists in number, figure, appearance and similar things, 
when these change it is not the same thing, but the human soul has its 
own special reality so that it can not come to an end by any change in the 
parts of the body. 
A thing can remain the same, even if it is changed, if it follows from its 
own nature that one and the same thing must have diverse, successive 
states. Without doubt, I am said to be the same as he who was before 
because my substance involves all my states, past, present and future. 
(Gr 323; VE 188-89). 
In this passage Leibniz not only affirmed the metaphysical princi- 
ple that an entity is an individual substance only if its properties 
are a consequence of its nature, but he connected the latter require- 
ment with the traditional requirement that an entity is an individ- 
ual substance only if it remains numerically identical over time in 
the strictest sense. Thus, in this passage Leibniz affirmed the con- 
junction of the Principle of Self-sufficiency and the Principle of 
Substantial Self-sufficiency and connected their conjunction with 
strict numerical identity.55 In a number of texts in our time period 
Leibniz made use of these ideas without explicitly affirming them 
in order to argue that an entity whose essence is extension and 
which, therefore, lacks a substantial form, cannot satisfy the condi- 
tions requisite to being an individual substance. Thus, contemplat- 
ing the supposition that the essence of body is extension, Leibniz 
wrote in paragraph 12 of The Discourse on Metaphysics: "if there 
were no other principle of identity in bodies than what we have 
just said, a body would never subsist more than a moment." While 
amplifying on the point made in this passage, Leibniz wrote the 
following in a letter to Arnauld: "Extension is an attribute that can 
not make up a complete entity: no action or change can be deduced 
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from it - it expresses only a present state, not at all the future and 
past as the concept of a substance must do" (G I1 72: MP 86). Here 
Leibniz claimed that any individual whose essence is extension 
will not satisfy the doctrine of marks and traces and, hence, will 
not be a substance. It is presupposed that any entity that lacks an 
internal principle of activity is no substance and that possession of 
an internal principle of activity of sufficient complexity to satisfy 
the doctrine of marks and traces and the doctrine of spontaneity 
yields an individual substance. These are but articulations of the 
ideas implicit in PSA. 
Suppose we put aside problems generated by God's miraculous 
intervention and formulate the doctrine of spontaneity as follows: if 
X is an individual substance, then for any noninitial state S of X, 
there is some state S' of X such that X'S being in S' provides a causal 
explanation for X'S being in S. Given this simplified version of the 
doctrine of spontaneity, we may attribute the following account of 
substantial persistence to Leibniz, an account which, in the absence 
of the doctrine of spontaneity, would be unacceptable: finite sub- 
stance X at t is strictly numerically identical with finite substance y 
at t' (with t' later than t) just in case some state of X at t is a causal 
ancestor of some state of y at t'. 
We may conclude that much of Leibniz's mature metaphysics of 
substance consists in an elaboration of the deep metaphysical princi- 
ples discussed earlier in this essay. Still, it is important not to exag- 
gerate the interpretive progress these conclusions permit. A decent 
question is this: what induced Leibniz to think that possession of a 
substantial form by an individual X brought it about that X, unlike 
some entity whose essence is extension, satisfied the various doc- 
trines and principles that constitute his metaphysics of substance? A 
tempting answer is that it is a matter of the definition Leibniz em- 
ployed of the term "substantial form." That answer may be a begin- 
ning, but it is no more than that. Leibniz drew conclusions about 
substances and substantial forms, based on the conception of substan- 
tial form standard in the traditions he inherited. It would be impor- 
tant to make sure that the inferences he drew from the tradition are 
warranted given his own, perhaps idiosyncratic, use of the term. 
Note that it is understandable why Leibniz would think that a 
substantial form itself satisfies the conditions required in order for 
an entity to be an individual substance. But the texts in our time 
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period suggest that Leibniz seriously considered the thesis that an 
extended entity with a substantial form may satisfy the relevant 
conditions and, hence, constitute a substance - a corporeal sub- 
s t a n c e . ~ ~  If we suppose that this is Leibniz's considered view in our 
period, then an important and difficult problem of interpretation 
arises: namely, what considerations induced Leibniz to come to a 
quite different conclusion in the final theory, i.e., the monadology? 
In Leibniz's final theory the only entities said to satisfy all the condi- 
tions required for possessing substantial unity are the monads. In 
the final theory Leibniz recognized various kinds of entities that 
may be treated usefully as individuals, although members of that 
kind do not possess substantial unity. Furthermore, in the final 
theory Leibniz made room for various levels of approximation to- 
ward substantial unity with so-called corporeal substances, for exam- 
ple, offering a closer approximation than mere aggregates thereof. 
In our period Leibniz was already committed to many of these 
ideas. In particular, he recognized the usefulness of treating certain 
entities as individuals even though they lack the substantial unity 
required of individual substances. (See letter to Arnauld, 30 April 
1687, G I1 100-102: MP 126-28.) Furthermore, he was prepared to 
recognize various levels of approximation to full substantial unity. 
Moreover, the same candidates were under consideration with essen- 
tially the same ordering as in the final theory: "mere aggregates" (e.g., 
a flock of sheep, a pile of sand), followed by bodies (e.g., a grain of 
sand), and animate bodies (e.g., a sheep). The difference is that in our 
period Leibniz gave the appearance of being in a genuine quandary 
about whether animate bodies satisfy the strictest standards of sub- 
stantial unity. 
One element that is common to the texts from our period and the 
final theory is Leibniz's commitment to the idea that these non- 
substantial individuals need not be admitted into one's ontology, not 
"in metaphysical rigor.lls-! In the correspondence with Arnauld, after 
noting the utility in some cases of treating nonsubstances as indi- 
viduals, Leibniz concluded: 
But one must not let oneself be deceived and make of them so many sub- 
stances or truly real beings; that is only for those who stop at appearances, 
or those who make realities out of all the abstractions of the mind. . . . 
Whereas I maintain that philosophy can not be better established, and re- 
duced to something precise, than by recognizing the only substances or 
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complete beings endowed with a true unity with their different states fol- 
lowing one another. All the rest are nothing but phenomena, abstractions, 
or relations. (G I1 101: MP 126-27) 
Leibniz's way wi th  individuals that  do not  amount t o  individual sub- 
stances i n  metaphysical rigor i s  to  treat them as logical constructions. 
In  t he  passage from "Notationes Generales" previously quoted, em- 
ploying a n  army as an  example of a n  aggregate and its soldiers as 
examples of substances, Leibniz noted that whatever is true of the 
aggregate, t he  army, may be restated utilizing propositions predicat- 
ing properties of i ts  component soldiers. Many of Leibniz's short, 
private pieces are exercises in  logical construction. 
T h e  questions raised i n  this section are difficult ones. But we 
should no t  lose sight of the  fact that  the notion of substance em- 
ployed here i s  a direct descendent of the  metaphysical principles 
assumed by Leibniz i n  t he  1660s. We have argued that those original 
principles prompted Leibniz to  construct a theory of substance i n  
1670 that  provides t he  framework for his metaphysical investiga- 
tions through the  period of the  Discourse on Metaphysics. We pro- 
pose that  a closer study of the principles elaborated and a fuller 
analysis of t he  difficult texts surveyed will provide a more complete 
picture of Leibniz's mature philosophy. We have made a start here, 
but  there i s  plenty of room for progress. 
N O T E S  
I Mercer is the author of sections 1-3; Sleigh of section 4. Most of the 
material of sections I and z appears in Mercer's Ph.D. thesis "The Origin 
and Development of Leibniz's Conception of Substance," Princeton 
(1989); section 3 is derived from a much expanded version of that work 
entitled Leibniz's Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development. The 
notes in the present chapter are truncated. For further argumentation 
and citation in support of the material presented in secs. 1-3, see Mer- 
cer's book. For a more detailed account of the metaphysics of the Dis- 
course on Metaphysics and some of the issues of sec. 4, see Sleigh, 
Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence. We 
have greatly benefited from advice and criticism offered by Daniel 
Garber, Stephen Grover, Daniel Fouke, Nicholas Jolley, Ohad Nachtomy, 
and Donald Rutherford. 
z There has been little scholarly work done on the 1660s. The most 
complete studies remain Kabitz, Die Philosophie des jungen Leibniz, 
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and Hannequin, "La Premikre Philosophie de Leibnitz." For recent 
work that is helpful on some details, see Belaval, Leibniz: Initiation a 
sa philosophie; Moll, Der lunge Leibniz, Vol. I & 11; Garber, "Motion 
and Metaphysics in the Young Leibniz," pp. 160-84; Robinet, Archi- 
tectonique disjonctive automates systkmiques et idealitL transcend- 
antale dans l'oeuvre de G.W. Leibniz, 3.1-4.6; Catherine Wilson, Leib- 
niz's Metaphysics: A Historical and Comparative Study, pp. 7-58; 
Fouke, "Metaphysics and the Eucharist in the Early Leibniz." 
3 For one of the most explicit, relatively early statements of Leibniz's 
conception of the close connections among metaphysics, "Natural The- 
ology," and "the mysteries of the faith," see A VI.iii 1 5 ~ f f ;  W 58ff This 
provocative essay dates from 1673-75 and not the mid-1680s as Wiener 
claims. See A VI.iii I 54. One recent scholar who has been concerned to 
explore the relationship between Leibniz's theological interests and his 
metaphysical development is Daniel C. Fouke whose excellent papers 
shed light on these and other important topics. See his "Metaphysics 
and the Eucharist," "Dynamics and Transubstantiation in Leibniz's Sys- 
tema Theologicum," "Spontaneity and the Generation of Rational Be- 
ings in Leibniz's Theory of Biological Reproduction." 
4 The nature and significance of humanism has been much discussed. For 
the most important recent discussions and references to the vast literature 
on humanism and the humanists, see Grafton, Defenders of the Text: The 
Tradition of Scholarshipin an Age of Science, 1430-1 800; The Transmis- 
sion of  Culture in  Early Modern Europe, eds., Grafton and Blair; and The 
Impact of Humanism on Western Europe, eds., Goodman and Mackay. 
5 Philosophia Eclectics (Altdorf, 1686). Sturm's works were widely read. 
Leibniz refers to them throughout his life (e.g., A V1.i 186 and G N 399, 
504)~ although he does not refer specifically to Philosophia eclectica. For a 
discussion of the role and use of Aristotle by Protestant German philoso- 
phers, see Bohatec, Die cartesianische Scholastik in der Philosophie und 
reformierten Dogmatik des 17. Iahrhunderts; Wundt, Die Philosophie an 
der Universitaet Iena and Die Deutsche Schulmetaphysik des 17. 
Iahrhunderts; and Petersen, Geschichte der aristotelischen Philosophie 
im protestantischen Deutschland. 
6 Motivated by the ground-breaking work of Charles Schmitt, there has 
recently been a re-evaluation of the role of Aristotelianism in the early 
modern period. See Schmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance and his Iohn 
Case and Aristotelianism in  Renaissance England; Brockliss, French 
Higher Education in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries and 
"Aristotle, Descartes, and the new Science: Natural Philosophy at the 
University of Paris, 1600-1740," 33-69; and Mercer, "The Vitality and 
Importance of Early Modern Aristotelianism." 
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7 For a discussion of the eclectic Aristotelians who had the greatest 
influence on Leibniz, see Mercer, "The Seventeenth-Century Debate 
between the Modems and the Aristotelians: Leibniz and Philosophia 
Reformata." 
8 For some of Leibniz's most explicit accounts of his method, both early 
and late, see A VI.iii 15~ff:  W 58ff.; G I11 606: L 654; GM V1 zjqff.: AG 
118ff., L 435ff.; G V11 127ff. For Leibniz's early commitment to the 
philosophy of Aristotle, see A 1I.i 57, L 107; A 1I.i 64; A VI.i 85; and esp. 
A VI.ii 434f.: L 94f. Mercer discusses the method in greater detail in her 
"Mechanizing Aristotle." 
9 An asterisk ( ' )  indicates a deviation from the translation cited. 
10 See also A 1I.i 22, A 1I.i 10, and especially A V1.i 489ff: L ~ogff. When 
Leibniz argues against the Modems, he has standard mechanists like 
Hobbes, Descartes, and Gassendi in mind. When he claims that most of 
the philosophy of Aristotle is "certain and demonstrated" (A 1I.i IS: L 
94), he has in mind his own eclectic brand of Aristotelianism, which can 
comfortably accommodate heavy doses of Platonism, about which we 
will say more below. 
I I The PS first appears in 1668 (A V1.i 490: L I 10). Loemker is mistaken 
about the date of the Confession of Nature against the Atheists: it was 
written in 1668 and not 1669. 
12 The PSS first occurs in 1668 (A V1.i 508: L I I S).  
13 The PCS first appears in 1668 (A VI.i 492: L 112) and is first explicitly 
stated in 1669 (A 1I.i 23: L 101-2). During the late 166os, the scope of the 
PS, PSS, and PCS appears to extend only to essential properties. By I 676, 
it has been extended to all properties. See sec. 3.4. 
14 The PSA first appears in 1668 (AV1 ii 508: L I I S ]  but occurs frequently 
thereafter. It is most often used as the core of a definition of substance, 
but it is also combined with the PSS in discussions about the characteris- 
tics of substance. 
15 The PSR is used in 1668 (A V1.i 492: L I I ~ ) ,  but its first explicit state- 
ment occurs in the winter of 1668-69 (A V1.i 494). Leibniz's first demon- 
stration of it appears in the winter of 1671-72; see A VLii 483. 
16 The notion of complete reason is used in several places (A VI.i 95; A V1.i 
176: L 80; A 1I.i 117: L 146), but its first appearance in an essay of 
metaphysical importance occurs in 1668 (A VI.ii qgof.: L I 11). Its first 
explicit formulation, where it is presented as the necessary and suffi- 
cient conditions for a thing, occurs in a note written in the winter of 
1671-72 (A VI.ii 483). 
17 For example, Gassendi writes in 1658: "It may be supposed that individ- 
ual atoms received from God.  . . the force [vis] requisite for moving, 
(and for] imparting motions to others. . . . All this to the degree that he 
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foresaw what would be necessary for every purpose. . . he had destined 
them for." See Bush, The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi, pp. 400- 
401. Descartes is also clear about the original source of motion (although 
the precise relation between God and the motion of a body at a particu- 
lar time is less easy to discern). He writes, for example, in the Principles 
of Philosophy, "God is the primary cause of motion. . . . Thus, God 
imparted various motions to the parts of matter when he first created 
them, and he now preserves all this matter in the same way, and by the 
same process by which he originally created it." See The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes, trans., Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch, Vol. I, p. 
240. It is important to note that Hobbes is the exception. Unlike the 
other standard mechanical philosophers, he seems to think that motion 
does not need an immaterial cause. 
18 Aristotle's notion of principle (the Greek is arche, the Latin translation 
for it became principium) has been much discussed. Suffice it to say here 
that a principle is the origin or source of something; a principle of activity 
therefore is the origin or source of activity. This sense of the term per- 
sisted throughout the early modem period, but is obviously different from 
what we think of as a principle today: a sort of basic truth or law. For a 
helpful introduction to the notion of principle and some related issues in 
Aristotle, see Witt, Substance and Essence in Aristotle: An Interpreta- 
tion of Metaphysics VII-IX, pp. 15-19; for an excellent discussion of the 
notion among medieval philosophers, see Gracia, Introduction to the 
Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, p. 37, passim. 
19 One feature of the theological essays which makes them so difficult is 
their imprecise terminology. Especially in the essays of 1668, Leibniz 
obscures the distinction between matter and body by often using "cor- 
pus" to refer to each. The distinction is however discernible, especially 
at A V1.i 502ff. and A 11.1  of. 
20 It follows from the PSA that insofar as mind is a source of activity it is 
itself a substance, i.e., it follows that mind is both a substance and a 
constituent of the substance that it creates with body qua matter. We 
will say more about this in sec. 3.2. It is worth noting that, in the 
theological writings of 1668-69, Leibniz uses both "substantial form" 
and "mind" to designate the incorporeal principle or active element in 
substance, often in the same essay. See for instance A VI.i 508-12: 
L 115ff. 
21 This is not occasionalism, but a kind of Platonized Aristotelianism in 
which God sustains the corporeal nature (by activating its matter 
through an Idea) so that the nature is able to act as the efficient cause of 
motion in other bodies (A VI.ii 5 I 1-12: L* I 18). For further discussion of 
these details, see Mercer's forthcoming book. For a fascinating discus- 
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sion of neo-Platonic elements in the account that Leibniz and other 
scholastic philosophers (e.g., Aquinas) give of God's relation to the cre- 
ated world, see Fouke, "Emanation and the Perfection of Being: Divine 
Causation and the Autonomy of Nature in Leibniz." 
22 In 1668 Leibniz gives both his first systematic argument against the 
mechanists (A V1.i 489ff.: L ~ogff.) and his first presentation of his origi- 
nal conception of substance (A 11.i  of.). 
23 Leibniz was especially concerned to treat satisfactorily "the mystery of 
the Eucharist," a topic on which he wrote a number of papers in connec- 
tion with the "Catholic Demonstrations." See A V1.i 501ff. For an inter- 
esting discussion of the importance which the problem of the Eucharist 
had for early Leibniz, see Fouke, "Metaphysics and the Eucharist." 
24 For someone in search of such a principle in the seventeenth century, 
the most obvious candidates were mind, soul, and substantial form (as 
some Aristotelians had defined it). Leibniz uses all three terms to desig- 
nate the incorporeal principle in substances, though he favors "mind" 
(mens) in the theological essays. 
25 There are four important changes which Leibniz makes to the published 
version of his April, 1669 letter to Thomasius. Compare ( I )  A 1I.i 20, line 
34 with A VI.ii 440, line 20; (2)  A 1I.i 22, line 24 with A VI.ii 442, line 5; 
(3) A 11.1 23, line 32 with A VI.ii 443, line 18; and (4) A 1I.i 23-24 with A 
VI.ii 443, line 19. In his edition of Leibniz's 1670 letter (VI, pp. 162-74) 
Gerhardt's list of changes is significantly incomplete. Garber mentions 
change (3) in his "Motion and Metaphysics in the Young Leibniz," p. 
I 7 I. For a commentary on this letter, which includes an analysis of the 
changes, see Mercer, Leibniz's Metaphysics. 
26 He also gave himself a more dramatic way of demonstrating the immor- 
tality of the soul: given that "mind consists in a point" and that "a point 
is indivisible and therefore cannot be destroyed," it follows that the 
mind or soul is immortal (A 1I.i I I 3 ) .  He presents this argument through- 
out the period. 
27 The notion of cause here is obscure. That there is a causal relation 
between the mind and the matter is obvious; what is not obvious is 
how exactly to conceive that relation. The most likely causal model 
is the neo-Platonic influxus one. For an excellent discussion of this 
model in the seventeenth century, see OINeill, "Influxus Physicus," 
pp. 27-5 5. For further details about Leibniz's notion of intrasubstantial 
causation in his philosophical development, see Mercer's forthcoming 
book. 
28 For a good introduction to the difficulties and tensions in the philosophy 
of the Discourse and for a survey of the literature about them, see C. 
Wilson, Leibniz's Metaphysics, chapter 111. 
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29 Leibniz arrived in Paris in March, 1672 and left in October, 1676. Be- 
tween early 1673 and late 1675, Leibniz applied most of his energies to 
mathematics; nearly all of his philosophical work falls on either side of 
this period. 
30 None of the relatively few studies of the Paris years has recognized its 
full importance. For the most helpful recent work see Catherine Wilson, 
Leibniz's Metaphysics, chapter 11; Fouke, "Leibniz's Opposition to Carte- 
sian Bodies during the Paris Period (1672-76)"; Parkinson, "Introduc- 
tion," De Summa Rerum and "Leibniz's De Summa Rerum: A System- 
atic Approach," pp. I 32-5 I; Kulstad, "Causation and Preestablished 
Harmony in the Early Development of Leibniz's PhilosophyUj pp. 93- 
I 17. Wilson and Kulstad include references to the preceding literature. 
3 I Between 1668 and 1676 there is no mention of any disembodied incorpo- 
real substances other than God. Cf. A VI.iii 74; 518: Pk 76. 
32 A mind is the source of the individuation of a substance in that it 
renders the substance the individual it is; it is the source of the identity 
of a substance in that it makes the substance the same thing over time. 
The distinction, often blurred in contemporary discussions, has been 
important in the history of philosophy. For an excellent discussion of 
these and related topics, see Gracia, Introduction to  the Problem of 
Individuation i n  the Early Middle Ages, chapter I. 
33 According to Leibniz, nonhuman substances exist from the creation of 
the world and never cease to be. Human substances, on the other hand, 
are created by God in the course of the world, but then exist eternally. 
34 The doctrine of expression as it appears in the mature philosophy is 
notoriously difficult to articulate. There has been a good deal of discus- 
sion in the literature both about what exactly the doctrine is and what 
motivated it. See, e.g., Mates, Philosophy of Leibniz, pp. 37ff; Sleigh, 
Leibniz and Arnauld, pp. 17off; Kulstad, "Causation and Preestablished 
Harmony," pp. 93ff. We address only the latter topic here and side-step 
the former altogether. 
3 5 Leibniz compares a mind to a mirror in some of his pre-Paris notes, but 
he does not develop the image. See, e.g., A V1.i 438; 464; 482. 
36 Although scholars agree that Leibniz's doctrines of expression and 
preestablished harmony stand at the center of the metaphysics of the 
Discourse, there has been a good deal of disagreement about when the 
doctrines first emerge, about what might have motivated their develop- 
ment, and about their interrelation. The earliest date that has been given 
for the emergence of either is 1678-79 and most commentators have 
placed their development at the time of the Discourse. For a summary 
and analysis of the most important secondary literature on these topics, 
see Kulstad, "Causation and Preestablished Harmony, pp. 93-1 17. 
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37 In his pre-Paris papers, Leibniz refers to the harmony among substances, 
but he does not develop the notion. See A 1I.i 79, 174; A VI.i 492: L I 12; 
A VI.ii 283. 
38 Scholars have noted Leibniz's many references to Plato, and a few 
French scholars have argued convincingly for Platonic elements in Leib- 
niz's thought, but there has not yet been a careful study of this difficult 
topic. For a helpful bibliography and an excellent introduction to Pla- 
tonic elements in Leibniz's conception of the relation between God and 
creation, see Fouke, "Emanation and the Perfection of Being." 
39 Just before departing for Paris, Leibniz claims that a requisite is a neces- 
sary condition and "all the requisites are the sufficient reason" for the 
existence of a thing (A VI.ii 483) . 
40 For the arithmetical analogy, see A VI.iii5 12: Pk 67; 523: Pk 83. For the 
town analogy, see A VI.iii 573: Pk 95; A VI.iii 523: Pk 83. Leibniz soon 
ceases to use the former analogy, but uses the latter in some of his most 
important later works. See, e.g., Discourse par.9; G IV 434: AG 42; 
Monadology, par. 57, G VI 616: AG 220; First Truths, C 521: AG 33, L 
269. Note that previous datings of the latter paper have been incorrect: 
the editors of the Akademie edition assign this much discussed text to 
1689. See Vorausedition, Faszikel 8, p. 1998. 
41 The development of this interpretation of Leibniz's production rule for 
the activities of mind was much aided by discussions with Ohad 
Nachtomy. For more details about how the production rule works, see 
Mercer's book. 
42 Scholars have often wondered about the precise relationship between 
the philosophy of Spinoza and that of Leibniz. There are striking resem- 
blances and it has been proposed that the former influenced the latter. 
It is a consequence of our interpretation that the philosophy of the 
Ethics could have had no extensive influence on the development of 
preestablished harmony and the related doctrines articulated in sec. 4 
since Leibniz neither saw a copy of the Ethics nor talked with its 
author about it until November, 1676. However, Leibniz had been 
made aware of some of Spinoza's doctrines earlier in that year. See A 
VI.iii 380, 384f; A VI.iii 580; A VI.iii 510: Pk 61; A 1I.i 304. For some 
recent literature on this topic, see Catherine Wilson, Leibniz's Meta- 
physics, pp. 69, 85ff.; Kulstad, "Causation and Pre-established Har- 
mony," pp. I   off. 
43 We saw in sec. 3.2 that, according to Leibniz, minds cannot act except 
through the matter to which they are attached and hence that the only 
active things in the created world are corporeal substances. Therefore, 
Leibniz's denial that "we act on them" and that "they act on us" is an 
explicit denial of intersubstantial causality. 
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44 It is not surprising that most of the commentators who have considered 
these passages have attributed to Leibniz a form of scepticism. See Brown 
Leibniz, pp. 39ff.; Catherine Wilson Leibniz's Metaphysics, pp. 66ff. 
45 We assume that this would not be true of aggregates of substances since 
an aggregate is not strictly an individual. For a discussion of the develop- 
ment of Leibniz's view of aggregates, see below. 
46 Late in 1676 (after his meeting with Spinoza) Leibniz pushed the relation 
between cause and effect a bit further and developed a principle that 
became important to his work on physics. In December, 1676 he writes: 
"There is  nothing without a cause, because there is nothing without all 
the requisites for existing. The entire effect is equipollent to the full 
cause, since there must be some equality between cause and effect, 
passing from one to the other" (A VI.iii 584: Pk 107). In the same month 
he explains more precisely what he means: "the cause is equipollent to 
the effect not in perfection but in expression" (A VI.iii 584: Pk 109) For 
the importance of this principle to Leibniz's physics, see Garber (this 
volume), secI. 
47 By far the most important of these was the problem of the continuum: 
"One must unravel, with the greatest rigour, the entire labyrinth con- 
cerning the composition of the continuum" (A VI.iii 475: Pk 27). Leibniz 
wrote a dialogue on this and related issues in the fall of 1676, see A VI.iii 
528-71. 
48 The Latin word "figura" is ambiguous in an important way. It can mean 
figure or shape, but also nature, kind, or species. When talking about the 
stuff of which bodies are made, Leibniz employs the latter sense where 
the idea is that the matter is an organized arrangement that makes up 
the nature of the body. See A 1I.i rof., 18; A V1.i 502. 
49 See, for example, "De Libertate," (FC 178-85: P 106-11) written in 
1689, in which, Leibniz wrote: "Once I had recognized the contingency 
of things, I then began to consider what a clear notion of truth would be; 
for I hoped, not unreasonably, to derive from it some light on the prob- 
lem of distinguishing necessary from contingent truth." Then, having 
summarized the concept containment account of truth, he added "But 
this only seemed to increase the difficulty for if, at a given time, the 
concept of the predicate is in the concept of the subject, then how, 
without contradiction and impossibility, can the predicate not be in the 
subject at that time . . . ? "  (FC 179: P107). 
50 Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, pp. 208-18. 
5 I Mondadori, "Reference, Essentialism, and Modality in Leibniz's Meta- 
physics." 
5 2  See, for example, Adams, "Predication, Truth, and Transworld Identity 
in Leibniz," pp. 235-83; and Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, pp. 126-32. 
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5 3 All of these doctrines are to be found in The Discourse on Metaphysics 
and the correspondence with Amauld. For details, see Sleigh, Leibniz 
and Arnauld, chapter 5. 
54 For a brilliant defense of the thesis that in this period Leibniz took 
extended entities to be basic individual substances, see Garber's seminal 
essay "Leibniz and the Foundations of Physics: the Middle Years" pp. 
27-30 For doubts about Garber's view, see Sleigh, Leibniz and Arnauld, 
pp. I 10-1 5.  For doubts about Sleigh's doubts, see Garber's review, The 
Iournal of Philosophy, 1992, especially pp. 52-5 5. 
55 Aside from "Notationes Generales" and "De Mundo Praesenti," the 
following texts from the Vorausedition are worth consulting on this 
matter: "Definitiones," pp. 411-12; and "Mira de natura substantiae 
corporeae," p. 294. 
56 This is particularly true of the Amauld correspondence, see Garber, 
op. cit. 
57 When Leibniz was about to place his ontological cards on the table he 
often said that he was speaking "in metaphysico rigore" or "dam la 
precision metaphysique," or "a la rigueur metaphysique." 
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